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THE NORMATIVE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL
COURTS
Nienke Grossman"
This Article's objective is to spark discussion about the standards by which we
judge international courts. Traditional justifications for the authority of international
courts are based on outmoded assumptions of their role and impact. State consent and
procedural fairness to litigants are insufficient to ground the legitimacy of institutions
that may adjudicate the international rights and duties of nonlitigants, deeply affect the
interests of non litigating stakeholders, and shape the law prospectively. These realities
mandate a new approach to the legitimacy of international courts. This Article presents
alternative or additional approaches for justifying the authority of international courts
rooted in both procedure and substance. First, legitimacy requires a reimagining of
procedural fairness to include those whose international rights and duties are being
adjudicated by international courts. Democratic theory can help to justify the authority
of international courts so long as stakeholders are given the opportunity to participate
in the formulation of policies that affect them. In addition, international courts must
adhere to certain universal standards ofjustice. They cannot facilitate the violation of
a set of core norms, including prohibitions against torture, slavery, racial
discrimination, and genocide, and still retain their legitimacy. Finally, the extent to
which an international court implements the objectives it was created for also affects
its legitimacy.
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INTRODUCTION

International courts and tribunals are deciding more disputes involving sovereign
states than ever before. They find facts, identify and interpret relevant rules, fill gaps
and ambiguities in the law, and apply rules to facts. International court judges are of
diverse citizenship, and they are charged with discerning the international
responsibility of sovereigns and awarding remedies as mandated by international law.
They include the International Court of Justice (lCJ), the World Trade Organization's
(WTO) Dispute Settlement Body, ad hoc tribunals under the auspices of the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (lCSID), the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and many others. 1 The implications of their decisions,
however, often go far beyond determining the rights and responsibilities of the
litigating parties in a particular case. They decide who has the right to exploit natural
resources and under what conditions, defme the scope of our human rights, delimit
international boundaries, and determine when the use of force is prohibited.

I. This Article focuses on international adjudicative bodies where at least one of the litigants is a
sovereign. Consequently, it does not include international criminal courts, where sovereigns are not litigants.
Although they too are international courts, they are involved in the determination of individual rather than state
responsibility.
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International courts no longer merely decide one-time disputes before them. They
shape and promote specific normative regimes like international investment, human
rights, humanitarian law, and trade law. Although international court decisions are not
formally binding, advocates before them, scholars, politicians, and judicial opinions
frequently cite them as if stare decisis were the prevailing rule. Even if one rejects the
value of international court decisions as binding precedent, it is difficult to deny the
influence of prior opinions in framing future ones. 2 Political actors invoke international
court opinions as if they constitute law, even when merely advisory.3 Judgments can
provide a focal point around which interested parties like nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), other states, and domestic and transnational constituencies can
mobilize. 4 Even for states not involved in a particular legal dispute, international court
decisions shape the standards by which their behavior is judged prospectively.
Unsurprisingly, as international courts' numbers and influence grow, so too do
challenges to their legitimacy. For example, with the burgeoning number of
international investment law arbitrations, legitimacy critiques are abundant. 5 Similarly,
the WTO literature is rife with concerns about institutional legitimacy.6 We may be
seeing renewed attention to the IeJ because of its growing case load and perceptions of
its great influence on international law. By failing to understand and respond to
legitimacy concerns, we endanger both the courts and the law they interpret and apply.
If international courts lack justified authority, so too will their interpretations of
international law. To the extent we want international courts to continue to serve as a
forum for the resolution of disputes involving sovereigns, we must preserve their
legitimacy. Because no world legislature exists to counterbalance the decisions of
international courts, and no worldwide police force enforces them, international courts'
legitimacy is all the more essential to their success.
This Article's goals are twofold. First, it seeks to break the mold of previous
theories of normative legitimacy of international courts. The Article focuses on
normative legitimacy for two reasons. Normative legitimacy provides a standard by
2. See Marc Jacob, Precedents: Lawmaking Through International Adjudication, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1005,
lOIS (2011) (addressing both the restrictive and guiding properties of precedent on future opinions); Joel P.
Trachtman & Philip M. Moremen, Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement:
Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 44 HARv. iNT'L L.J. 221, 223 (2003) (noting that even though stare decisis does
not apply in WTO litigation, judicial opinions often have some legislative force, filling in gaps left open by
treaty writers and legislators); Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name? An Investigation of
International Courts' Public Authority and Its Democratic Justification, 23 EUR. J. INT'L L. 7, 18 (2012)
(stating that some international courts have certain coercive mechanisms that require adherence to precedent in
future decisions).
3. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text for examples.
4. KAREN ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 1617).

5. See, e.g., David D. Caron, Investor State Arbitration: Strategic and Tactical Perspectives on
Legitimacy, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'LL. REv. 513,515-16 (2009) (noting multiple legitimacy critiques of the
system of investor state arbitration); Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human
Rights?, 60 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 573, 573 (2011) (stating that the legitimacy of international investment
treaties and arbitration has been attacked in recent years).

6. See, e.g., Jeffery Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 451,452-53 (2001)
(asserting that public interest groups, public intellectuals, and trade scholars have all ''underscored the WTO's
legitimacy problem").
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which to judge an international court and to decide whether it merits SUpport. 7 It seeks
to identify what qualities provide international courts with the "right to rule" or what
justifies their authority.s It is objective and rooted in philosophy or political theory.9 In
addition, normative legitimacy can influence sociological legitimacy, or perceptions of
justified authority, and thereby, the extent to which we undergird or undercut the work
of international COurtS.1O If international actors perceive an international court as
illegitimate, they can de fund the court, ignore its decisions, or render its rulings
irrelevant. While legitimacy is not the only normative standard by which international
courts can be judged, it is a vital one. It tells us why a state should obey a court's ruling
even if it may run contrary to the state's perceived interests to do so. It allows for the
coordination of support by many different actors because it is based in moral, rather
than strategic or self-interested reasons.ll Normative legitimacy can help identify
where international courts are lacking and what can be done to strengthen them.
As Section II explains, traditional approaches to normative legitimacy are based
on outmoded assumptions about the effects of international court decisions beyond the
litigating parties and the purposes of international adjudication. The beneficiaries of
international court decisions include a multitude of actors not immediately before a
court in a particular case, such as states, individuals, peoples, and corporations.
International adjudication's underlying goals have changed dramatically since the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from an almost exclusive focus on state-tostate dispute settlement to prevent war to something much more complex. The
objectives of international adjudicative bodies today include the advancement of
particular normative goals like the promotion of human rights or trade and the
maintenance of cooperative arrangements. 12 We must acknowledge these realities and
their implications. The predominant approaches to normative legitimacy are
anachronistic.
The second objective of this Article, in Section III, is to propose a new theory of
7. See Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20.4
ETHICS & INT'L AFFAIRS 405, 405-{)6 (2006) (suggesting that a global public standard of legitimacy can help
citizens distinguish legitimate institutions from illegitimate ones).
8. Id. at 405; Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for
International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 601 (1999).
9. Daniel Bodansky, The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law, in LEGITIMACY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 309, 313 (Rtldiger Wolfrum & Volker ROben eds., 2008).
10. See Bodansky, supra note 8, at 601 (asserting that popular views about an authority comprise one
dimension of that authority'S legitimacy); Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 7, at 405 ("An institution is
legitimate in the sociological sense when it is widely believed to have the right to rule."); Richard H. Fallon Jr.,
Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARv. 1. REv. 1787, 1795 (2005) (discussing legitimacy as a
sociological concept and defming it as whether the relevant public views the authority as justified or
appropriate). Sociological legitimacy is drawn from the work of Max Weber. MAx WEBER, MAx WEBER ON
LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 5 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., Harvard
University Press 1969); Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 GEO. WASH.
INT'LL. REv. 107, 116 (2009); Alan Hyde, The Concept ofLegitimation in the Sociology ofLaw, 1983 WIS. 1.
REv. 379, 380-82 (1983). Sociological legitimacy is subjective, agent relative, and dynamic, and can be tested
by empirical research. Grossman, supra, at 116-17; Bodansky, supra note 9, at 313.
II. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 7, at 409.
12. Yuval Shany, No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New
International Judiciary, 20 EURO. J.lNT'L L. 73, 76 (2009).
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normative legitimacy for international courts. Legitimacy is a complex concept, and
many different elements contribute to it. Identifying all of them is a Herculean, if not
impossible, task. This Article proposes procedural and substantive requirements. First,
a theory of legitimacy of international courts must, at a minimum, recognize the role
and rights of actors beyond the state and the changed purposes of international
adjudication. Specifically, legitimacy requires a reimagining of procedural fairness to
include nonlitigants and nonstate parties, whose international rights and duties are
being adjudicated by international courts, and stakeholders, when courts are engaged in
law or policy making. Further, international courts' legitimacy turns, in part, on their
ability to help states do a better job of complying with a core set of human rights
obligations than states would in their absence. I3 Also, international courts cannot
facilitate the violation by states of these core norms and retain their legitimacy. Finally,
legitimacy hinges on how well courts further the underlying purposes of the normative
regimes they were established to interpret and apply.
Despite the proliferation of international courts and tribunals, "no new theory
accompanies them. We continue to think about international adjudication in view of
ideas and proposals dating back to around the turn of the twentieth century."14 The
purpose of this Article is to challenge prevailing assumptions about the normative
legitimacy of international adjudicative bodies and to begin a discussion about the
standards by which they should be judged.
II.

A.

BREAKING THE MOLD

The Mold: State Consent and Procedural Fairness to the Litigants

State consent is one traditional approach to normative legitimacy. The idea is that
international institutions, including international adjudicative bodies, derive legitimacy
from the consent of states to their jurisdiction. IS The state consent approach legitimates
authority by focusing on its sources or origins. 16 So long as states consent to it,
authority is justified. Because states are sovereign and independent, an international

13. See infra Part III.B.2 for this Article's adoption of an instrumentalist approach to legitimacy inspired
by Joseph Raz's "service conception" of authority. Raz describes the service conception as a "normative
doctrine about the conditions under which authority is legitimate and the manner in which authorities should
conduct themselves." JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 63 (1986); see also John Tasioulas,
Parochialism and the Legitimacy of International Law, in PAROCHIALISM, COSMOPOLITANISM, AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 16, 19 (M.N.S. Sellers ed., 2012); Lukas H. Meyer & Pranay
Sank1echa, Introduction, to LEGITIMACY, JUSTICE AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-8 (Lukas H. Meyer,
ed., 2009).
14. Martti Koskenniemi, The Ideology ofInternational Ac(judication and the 1907 Hague Conference, in
TOPICALITY OF THE 1907 HAGUE CONFERENCE, THE SECOND PEACE CONFERENCE 127, 127 (Yves Daudet ed.,
2008); see also Artnin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as
Lawmakers, 12 GERMAN L.J. 979,980 (2011) (asserting that "neither theory nor doctrine has yet adequately
captured" the increase in volume or change in development ofintemational COU1'tS).
IS. JAN KLABBERS ET AL., THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (2009); Meyer &
Sanklecha, supra note 13, at 4; Bodansky, supra note 8, at 597, 605; Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 7, at
412-13.
16. RUdiger Wolfrum, Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective: Some Introductory
Considerations, in LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at I, 6.
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adjudicative body cannot justify the exercise of its power to decide disputes involving
states without their agreement. In the words of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, the predecessor court to the ICJ:
This rule, moreover, only accepts and applies a principle which is a
fundamental principle of international law, namely, the principle of the
independence of States. It is well established in international law that no
State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other
States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific
settlement. I?
More recently, in Application of the International Convention on the Elimination ofAll
Forms ofRacial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation),18 the ICJ stressed the
importance of the "fundamental principle of consent."19
In the same vein, a court that acts beyond the scope of the authority delegated by
states, or ultra vires, lacks legitimacy.2o Also called "legality" or "legal legitimacy," it
too traces to state consent. 21 When states submit to the jurisdiction of a court, they do
so under a specified set of conditions and expectations of the court's power. These
conditions are established in a court's statute or in an arbitration agreement or
compromis. For example, states may prescribe the sources of law that a court must rely
upon. Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ contains the canonical list of the sources the
court "shall apply."22 Similarly, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States provides that arbitral tribunals
must
decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by
the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the
law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the
conflict oflaws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable. 23
If a court were to apply some other source of law, it would disrespect the boundaries
prescribed by state consent, and its authority would lack justification. Again, the key to
authority is the consent of states. A court that evades or ignores the limitations placed
upon its authority by states threatens its legitimacy.
The frame of reference for analyzing the grant and scope of consent is almost

17. Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.U. (ser. B) No. 5, ~ 33 (July 23); see also
Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Provisional Measures, 2002 I.C.J.
220, 220 (fmding that litigating states must grant consent for the ICJ to adjudicate their disputes); Monetary
Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K., U.S.), Preliminary Question, 1954 I.C.J. 19,34 (June 15)
(noting that the ICJ cannot determine the international responsibility of a state without its consent).
18. Preliminary Objections, 2011 I.CJ. I (Apr. I).

19. Elimination ofRacial Discrimination, 2011 I.C.J. ~ 131.
20. Bodansky, supra note 8, at 605.
21. Id. at 605.
22. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945,33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ
Statute]; H. Vern Clemons, Comment, The Ethos of the International Court of Justice Is Dependent upon the
Statutory Authority Attributed to Its Rhetoric: A Metadiscourse, 20 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1479, 1486-87
(1996).
23. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States
art. 42, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter ICSID
Convention].
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always the state, and no other entity or person. Courts consider whether a state has
consented and analyze the scope of that consent. Even in bodies where nonstate actors
may sue states, such as the ECHR and ICSID, jurisdiction still rests on an expression of
state consent. 24
A second traditional approach to legitimacy focuses on the fairness and adequacy
of decision-making processes. 25 While the state consent approach derives legitimacy
from the origins of authority, the process approach links the legitimacy of a court to the
processes it uses to render decisions. 26 The idea is that the rulings of a court with fair
and impartial adjudicators and processes are worthy of respect, while those from unfair
judges and processes are not. An international adjudicative body that operates by rules
that ensure fairness and impartiality to the litigating parties is more legitimate than one
that is biased against one of the litigating parties or fails to afford them equal
opportunities to be heard.27
A legitimate process will provide litigants with equal opportunities to present their
views both orally and in writing and to respond to the views of the opposing party.
Then, an open-minded adjudicator will assess the arguments and produce a judgment
that one or both litigants may disagree with, but is authoritative nonetheless. 28
Procedural fairness is associated with the principle of audi alteram partem, literally,

24. E.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 25,
Nov. 4,1950,213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]; ICSID Convention, supra note 23, art. 25.

25. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 7 (1995) (discussing
both procedural and substantive fairness); Bodansky, supra note 8, at 612 (stating that "authority can be
legitimate because it involves procedures considered to be fair"); lH.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the
Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Selliement, 35 J.
WORLD TRADE 191,204 (2001) (explaining that the legitimacy of courts is largely based on their ability "to
listen to the parties, to deliberate impartially favoring neither the powerful nor the meek, to have the courage to
decide and then, crucially, to motivate and explain the decisions").
26. Rudiger Wolfrum identifies source-, procedure-, and result-oriented approaches for legitimating
authority. Wolfrum, supra note 16, at 6.

27. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Acijudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353,382 (1978)
(arguing that the integrity of adjudication must be judged by whether "the meaning of the affected party's
participation in the decision by proofs and reasoned arguments" is adversely affected); Application for Review
of Judgment No. 158 of United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1973 I.C.J. 166, 179 (July
12) ("The principle of equality of the parties follows from the requirements of good administration of justice."
(quoting Judgments of Administrative Tribunal of International Labour Organisation upon Complaints Made
Against United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation, Advisory Opinion, 1956 I.C.J. 77,
86 (Oct. 23»); MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS I (1981) (discussing
the "ideal type" of courts, involving "an independent judge" and "adversary proceedings," among other
elements); Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory
Opinion, 1973 I.C.J. 166, 179 (July 12) ("The principle of equality of the parties follows from the
requirements of good administration of justice." (quoting Judgments of Administrative Tribunal of
International Labour Organisation upon Complaints Made Against United Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organisation, Advisory Opinion, 1956 I.C.J. 77, 86 (Oct. 23»; Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits
of Acijudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 382 (1978) (arguing that the integrity of adjudication must be judged
by whether "the meaning of the affected party's participation in the decision by proofs and reasoned
arguments" is "adversely affected").
28. Martin Shapiro calls this the "triad." SHAPIRO, supra note 27, at 1-2. The further one moves away
from the characteristics of the triad, the greater the challenges to a court's legitimacy. Id.
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"[IJisten to the other side."29 It requires that international courts, like domestic ones,
treat all parties equally and provide equal opportunities for advocacy.3o In the words of
the ICJ, such principles "are integral constituents of the rule of law and justice."31 Fair
process focuses on the litigants before a tribunal in a particular case, not on interested
or potentially affected parties beyond the courtroom. The approach assumes, too, that
open-minded and impartial adjudicators exist and that we can construct impartial
benches.
An alternative approach to the legitimacy of international courts is to apply a
justice lens to outcomes. Even if states consent to adjudication and procedures are fair,
a court that makes immoral or unjust rulings lacks legitimacy. This approach differs
from the consent and process approaches because it focuses on institutional outputs,
rather than what engenders them. It assumes that an objective and universal standard of
justice exists and is discernible. Because many scholars have shied away from justice in
assessing the legitimacy of international courts, it is not included within the "traditional
approaches" critiqued below, but rather is addressed in Part III.B.
B.

Why the Mold Is Broken
1.

Changes in the Role and Impact of International Courts

The traditional approaches to normative legitimacy of international courts rest on
at least two flawed assumptions. The first is that international courts affect only the
litigants in a particular case. The second is that international courts' primary role is to
resolve one-time disputes between state actors. These assumptions are either too simple
or just plain wrong. First, the influence of international courts extends far beyond the
litigating parties because international courts make law that is used by other courts and
nonlitigants. International courts shape the obligations of states prospectively and
impact both state and nonstate actors not before the court. Second, rather than solely
deciding narrow disputes between states, international courts explicitly promote
specific normative re.gimes like human rights or free trade. These realities have serious
implications for traditional approaches to normative legitimacy.
International court decisions influence the development of law and politics. "The
de facto lawmaking role played by international judges cannot be denied."32 Judges,
lawyers, scholars, and politicians use previous international court decisions to support
their legal arguments and to justify policy decisions. A quick read of almost any
international court's opinions shows that judges cite and place weight on their own

29. AARON X. FELLMETH & MAURICE HORWITZ, GUIDE TO LATIN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (2009).

30. ld.
31. Request for Examination of Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of Court's Judgment of 20
December 1974 in Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995I.C.J. 288, 325 (Sept. 22).
32. DANIEL TERRIS ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEN AND WOMEN
WHO DECIDE THE WORLD'S CASES 115-17 (2007) (discussing a number of different examples, ranging from
the European and Inter-American human rights courts' contribution to the development of human rights law
"far beyond what the original drafters [of the respective conventionsI might have conceived," to the role of the
European Court of Justice in European integration, to the WTO Appellate Body's inclusion of other areas of
international law within its jurisdiction); see also von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 14, at 979 (stating that
international judicial decisions influence future decisions).
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court's previous decisions. 33 International judges admit that they examine and consider
other courts' decisions when relevant. Fonner vice president of the ICJ, Judge Guy de
Lacharriere stated: "There is a body of international jurisprudence. When a case is
presented to an international tribunal, be it our own tribunal or any ad hoc arbitration
tribunal, the judge, the members of this tribunal, draw constantly from the international
jurisprudence."34 Fonner ICJ Judge Thomas Buergenthal acknowledged,
Contrary to what one would think, we at the ICJ do read decisions of other
courts that bear on what we are doing. And even though we don't cite
them-I've written and said we should cite them, but we don't cite themwe do read them, and we take different views into account when they are
relevant. 35
Further, a number of courts, including the ICJ, have cited the opinions of other courts.
The Andean Tribunal of Justice has repeatedly referenced the European Court of
Justice's (ECJ) jurisprudence on the preemptive power and supremacy of community
law and intellectual property law. 36 In EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones),3? the WTO Appellate Body cited the ICJ's judgment in
GabCikovo-Nagymaros Project (HungaryISlovakiaj38 on the legal status of the
precautionary principle. 39 The ICJ quoted the International Criminal Tribunal for the
fonner Yugoslavia on the meaning of intent to commit genocide. 4o
Lawyers, too, cite decisions of other courts or previous decisions of the same
court in making legal arguments. 41 Although judicial opinions are supposed to be only
33. See MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 29-31 (1996) ("The cumulative
effect of these and other instances is to establish, first, the existence of a case law of the Court, and second, the
practical importance which the Court attaches to the maintenance of consistency in its holdings. As to the first
point, the Court is itself on record as treating its previous decisions as constituting 'the case-law of the
Court'."); von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 14, at 981 (discussing the development of international
investment law as judge-made law).
34. GARRY STURGESS & PHILIP CHUBB, JUDGING THE WORLD: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE WORLD'S
LEADING COURTS 458 (1988).
35. TERRIS ET AL., supra note 32, at 98.
36. Ricardo Vigil Toledo, EI reflejo de la jurisprudencia europea en los fallos del Tribunal
de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina: aspectos te6ricos y pragmaticos [European Jurisprudence as Reflected in
Judgments of the Court of Justice of the Andean Community: Theoretical and Pragmatic Aspects] 1-4 (Feb.
10, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.upf.eduiconstitucional/actualitatlPDFs/abstracts/
Vigil.pdf; see also Karen J. Alter & Laurence R. Helfer, Nature or Nurture? Judicial Lawmaking in the
European Court ofJustice and the Andean Tribunal ofJustice, 64 INT'L ORG. 563, 570 (2010) (observing that
the Andean Tribunal of Justice in its first case declared the supremacy of Andean law by citing a decision of
the European Court of Justice that obligated national courts to enforce community law).
37. Appellate Body Report, WTIDS26/ABIR, WTIDS48/ABIR (Jan. 16, 1998).
38. Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).

39. Meat Products Report, ~ 123, WTIDS26/ABIR, WTIDS48/ABIR (citing GabNkovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hung'/Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, ~ 111-114, 140).
40. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v.
Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ~ 188 (Feb. 26).
41. For example, in Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matter (Djibouti v. France), in the ICJ,
counsel for both France and Djibouti cited a number of ICSID arbitral tribunal awards in discussing selfjudging clauses in treaties. E.g., Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.),
2008 I.C.J. Pleadings 24 (Jan. 29, 2008) (citing CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ~ 371 (May 12, 2005)); Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal
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a "subsidiary means" for the determination of international law,42 academics and
renowned publicists rely on international court decisions when restating international
legal principles or engaging in the progressive development of international law. For
example, the International Law Commission makes reference to the decisions of
international adjudicative bodies, especially the ICI, in drafting international treaties
for states' consideration and adoption. 43 Political bodies like the United Nations
General Assembly use even merely advisory opinions to pressure states. The United
Nations General Assembly used the ICI's advisory opinion in Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory« to "demand[]" that
Israel comply with the opinion, by a vote of 150 to 6, even though Israel never
consented to the jurisdiction of the court. 4S Advisory opinions not only shape political
conditions but also contribute to the development of international legal principles. 46
International court opinions, too, can serve as focal points to mobilize domestic and
international interest groups in favor of or against a particular policy.47
International judicial decisions can either directly or indirectly affect a broad
range of stakeholders not immediately before the court, such as other states, peoples,
individuals, and corporations. Indeed, some judges admit that international court
decisions are intended to have impacts beyond the litigating parties at the time they are
written. Former ICI judge and president, Manfred Lachs, commented that:
[Y]ou do not only decide the dispute between state A and state B, you
perform an educational function. You indicate to states A and B how their
dispute should be solved, but you also give a wider background to all nations
so that similar issues, or related issues, should be solved in a similar way.48
Lachs advocated the articulation of obiter dicta, or articulated general principles
unnecessary to resolve the dispute, to clarify the law and provide guidance to states
about their responsibilities to the international community.49 Similarly, former
president of the ICI, Nagendra Singh, added that judges "generalise and enunciate
Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), 2008 I.CJ. Pleadings 23 (Jan. 22, 2008) (citing Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01l3, Award, ~~ 322-45 (May 22, 2007); CMS Gas Transmission
Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/OIl8, Award, ~~ 353-78 (May 12,2005); Sempra Energy
Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ~~ 364-91 (Sept. 28, 2007)).
42. IC] Statute, supra note 22, art. 38.
43. For example, in its Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, the International Law
Commission commented that "[t]here is much authority in the jurisprudence of international tribunals for the
proposition that in the present context the principle of good faith is a legal principle which forms an integral
part of the rule pacta sunt servanda." INT'L LAW COMM'N, DRAFT ARTICLES ON THE LAW OF TREATIES WITH
COMMENTARIES 211 cmt. 2 (1966). This statement is supported by a discussion of decisions of the IC], the
Permanent Court ofinternational Justice, and arbitral tribunals. Id.
44. Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.CJ. 136 (July 9).
45. G.A. Res. 10/15, at 4, U.N. Doc. AlRESIES-10/15 (Aug. 2, 2004).

46. See Karin Oellers-Frahm, Lawmaking Through Advisory Opinions?, 12 GERMAN LJ. 1032, 1040-41
(2011).
47. See ALTER, supra note 4, at 16-17 (discussing "politically meaningful" rulings that may elicit state
or government responses); Christina Binder, The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, 12 GERMAN LJ. 1203, 1225-26 (2011) (arguing that the prohibition of amnesty laws by the
Inter-American Court helped domestic courts and human rights constituencies fight impunity).
48. STURGESS & CHUBB, supra note 34, at 89.
49. Id. at 90.
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principles of jurisprudence which would serve as a guide to prevent future disputes and
to the establishment of a regime of law."5o
Decisions can shape the law prospectively by creating or limiting rights and
obligations for nonlitigating states, as well as individuals. For example, the decision of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Barrios Altos v. Peru 51 that all amnesty
laws violate the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, not just the one
immediately before the court, impacted all states with such laws that were also parties
to the Convention. 52 It also created the theoretical possibility for legal relief for many
individuals whose claims were previously barred by amnesty laws.
In several recent cases in the IC}, nonlitigants' rights were directly affected by
proceedings in which they had no right to appear. For example, Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening)53 had significant
impacts on nonlitigating parties. The court ruled that states enjoy jurisdictional
immunity for acta jure imperU 54 occasioning death, personal injury, or damage to
property committed by armed forces or other state organs in the forum state during the
course of an armed conflict, and that the gravity of the crimes committed or the lack of
any other remedy does not warrant a suspension of immunity under customary
international law as it currently stands. 55 As a result, Italian and Greek citizens who
suffered from massacres of loved ones, forced labor, or improper denials of prisoner of
war status by the German Reich lost their right to a remedy for serious violations of
their human rights,56 despite that several human rights instruments require states to
provide remedies for violations of human rights. 57 Future claimants will suffer the
consequences of this decision too.
Similarly, the ICrs advisory opinion in an appeal from a decision of the
International Labour Organization's Administrative Tribunal dealt directly with the

50. !d. at 452.
51. Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, (Mar. 14,2001).
52. Barrios Altos, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ~ 41 (deeming all "amnesty provisions, provisions
on prescription and the establishment of measures designed to eliminate responsibility" as inadmissible); see
also Binder, supra note 47, at 1209-11, 1222-26 (discussing subsequent Inter-American Court of Human
Rights cases relying upon this decision and the reaction of non litigating states).
53. Judgment, 2012I.C.J. I (Feb. 3).
54. Acta jure imperii are acts concerning the exercise of sovereign power. Jurisdictional Immunities,
2012 I.C.J. ~ 60.
55. !d. ~~ 77, 91,97.
56. See id. ~~ 104, 139 ("In coming to this conclusion, the Court is not unaware that the immunity from
jurisdiction of Germany in accordance with international law may preclude judicial redress for the Italian
nationals concerned. ").
57. See, e.g., Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 14, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 112 (declaring that "[e)ach State
Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress"); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (requiring each
signatory to "adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary" to ensure available remedies for
violations of human rights); Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 8, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
NRES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (declaring that "[e)veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by
law").
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rights of an employee of the International Fund for Agricultural Development. 58
Although the complainant before the Administrative Tribunal had no right to speak or
to representation derived from the IC] Statute, the IC] gave her the opportunity to
present her views in writing, implicitly recognizing the direct impact of the case on her
rights. 59
The Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. Ecuadorf'° case in the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA) is another stark example of how nonlitigants' rights or
interests may be directly affected by proceedings in which they may play no part. This
case involved a determination of responsibility over environmental degradation and
personal injuries that Texaco Petroleum's activities allegedly caused to tens of
thousands of Ecuadorians. 61 After the filing of several lawsuits by both Ecuadorian
plaintiffs and Chevron in both the United States and Ecuador, Chevron and Texaco
filed a Notice of Arbitration in the PCA in The Hague, the Netherlands, in 2009. 62
Specifically, Chevron and Texaco alleged that Ecuador violated several provisions of
the Ecuador-United States Bilateral Investment Treaty, including its obligations to (1)
provide fair and equitable treatment to the claimants' investment, (2) provide effective
means of asserting and enforcing rights under the treaty, (3) not to impair a number of
rights with respect to the use of the investment, (4) not to treat the investment less
favorably than national investments, and (5) to observe any obligations entered into
with respect to the investment. 63 Chevron asked the court to declare that it had "no
liability or responsibility for environmental impact, including but not limited to ...
human health, the ecosystem, indigenous cultures, [and] the infrastructure."64 The 1976
Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
applicable to this dispute did not provide for amicus curiae, or "friend of the court,"
briefs. 65 Consequently, if decisions in this case directly affected the rights or interests
of indigenous peoples, as Fundaci6n Pachamama and the International Institute for
Sustainable Development argued in a brief to the PCA,66 the rules provided no right for

58. Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization upon
Complaint Filed Against the International Fund for Agricultural Development, Advisory Opinion, 2012 I.C.J.
I (Feb. I).

59. Id. '113.
60. Case No. 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009).
61. Claimants' Notice of Arbitration '1125, Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. Ecuador, Case No.
2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009). In November 1993, a class of 30,000 Ecuadorian plaintiffs sued Texaco, Inc.,
in federal court in the Southern District of New York, for personal injury and damage to their property caused
by petroleum operations in Ecuador. Id. In May 2003, another set of plaintiffs sued Chevron in Lago Agrio,
Ecuador, after the 1993 U.S. suit was dismissed for forum non conveniens.ld. '11'1125, 30.
62. /d. '11'1125, 30.

63. Id. '1169.
64. Id. '1176.
65. Id. at I (stating that the notice was "proceeding under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules"); United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. Doc. AlRES/31/98
(Dec. 15, 1976) (lacking a provision on amicus briefs); see also United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. Doc. AlRES/65/22 (Jan. 10,2011) (demonstrating that
the 2010 revised version of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules also contains no provisions on amicus briefs).
66. Petition for Participation as Non-Disputing Parties '11'11 3.1, 3.4, Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum
Co. v. Ecuador, Case No. 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010). The tribunal ruled that nonlitigants had no right to
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those peoples to seek to influence the decisions of the tribunal. Rather, the only way to
get their perspective into the litigation would be to rely on Ecuador. Unfortunately,
there is no guarantee that Ecuador (or any other country) will faithfully represent the
views of particular interest groups within its borders, and it may have incentives to
prioritize other concems. 67
International courts may not only directly affect rights and duties of nonlitigants,
but they may also impact the interests of a variety of stakeholders. For example, the
IeJ's ruling in the Pulp Mills case68 may affect corporations, individuals, and states
where corporations intend to undertake development projects with possibly significant
transboundary adverse impacts. The IeJ faced the question whether Uruguay violated
the procedural and substantive requirements of the Uruguay River Statute,69 a bilateral
treaty establishing a prior notification and consultation regime and a regulatory
framework for limiting water pollution, after Uruguay authorized, constructed, and
operated a pulp mill on its side of the River Uruguay.70 Within its judgment, the court
asserted that transboundary environmental impact assessments are required by
customary international law.1 1 The court's ruling may affect the rigor of standards for
environmental impact assessments and, consequently, a company's choice to undertake
a project or a state's decision to grant authorizations for construction and operation of
facilities in a transboundary context.1 2 The decision may impact how international
financial institutions and private banks evaluate loan applications for projects with
transboundary impacts. Finally, it may affect individuals in both Uruguay and
Argentina whose views may not have been represented by their states in the courtroom,
perhaps by modifying economic opportunities or environmental conditions. The IeJ
Statute and Rules of Procedure afford none of these nonstate stakeholders any right to
appear before the court or to submit amicus briefs. 73 A nonlitigating state may

file amicus curiae briefs during the jurisdictional phase. Procedural Order No. 8 ~ 20, Chevron Corp. & Texaco
Petroleum Co. v. Ecuador, Case No. 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2011). The request does not appear to have been
renewed at a later stage of the proceedings.
67. See Judith Kirnerling, Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia: The Case of Ecuador.
Chevrontexaco. and Aguinda v. Texaco, 38 NY.U. J. INT'L L. & POL 413, 426-33 (2006) (discussing
Ecuador's Amazon policy of "internal colonization" and development of oil reserves and its impact on
indigenous communities); see also Brief for Fundaci6n Pacharnama and the International Institute for
Sustainable Development as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents ~ 4.7, Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum
Co. v. Ecuador, Case No. 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010) (describing sources criticizing Ecuador's conduct
with respect to access to justice for indigenous peoples); Gerald P. Neugebauer III, Note, Indigenous Peoples
as Stakeholders: Influencing Resource Management Decisions Affecting Indigenous Community Interests in
Latin America, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1227, 1230, 1237-40 (2003) (pointing to the Ecuadorian Amazon as an
example of the insufficiency of "relying primarily on governmental mechanisms" to protect the human rights
afforded to indigenous groups).
68. Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C,J. 14 (Apr. 20).
69. Statute of the River Uruguay, Uru.-Arg., Feb. 26, 1975, 1295 U.N.T.S. 340.
70. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.e.J. ~~ 22-23,67.
7L ld. ~ 204.
72. See id. ~~ 209-11,223-25 (evaluating whether the specific actions taken by Uruguay complied with
due diligence requirements for conducting environmental impact assessments).
73. ICJ Statute, supra note 22, art. 34 (providing that "[o]nly states may be parties in cases before" the
ICJ). Interestingly, the IC]'s judgment stated, too, that none of the instruments invoked by Argentina
supported a legal obligation to consult with affected populations. Pulp Mills, 20 I 0 I.C,J. ~ 216.
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intervene only if the court determines it has "an interest of a legal nature which may be
affected by the decision in the case."74 States do, however, have the right to intervene if
the court is interpreting a treaty to which they are parties. 75 These requests to intervene
are rarely granted. 76
In the same vein, several scholars have raised concerns or acknowledged the
impact of international investment and trade law adjudications on human rights and the
environment, and thereby, on rights arid stakeholders, through ICSID and the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body. Among these are former ICJ Judge Bruno Simma, who
points out the concerns of states, civil society, and NGOs about the impact of
international investment law on their rights and interests and attempts to put human
rights in a more prominent place within investment treaty arbitration. 77 In response to a
question about human rights, the environment, and litigation at ICSID, SecretaryGeneral Meg Kinnear acknowledged that human rights may be linked to investment
arbitration "when tribunals are looking at cases that arise in a certain context,
particularly with regards to environmental issues" or when a party is defending an
expropriation on the basis of police powers. 78 Some have gone so far as to criticize
ICSID for providing "almost a carte blanche for investor human rights abuses."79 The
2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty recognizes the interconnectedness of
international investment law and, therefore, its adjudication, on health, safety, the
environment, and labor rights. 8o It also contains specific provisions on investment and
the environment, investment and labor rights, and the transparency of investment
proceedings. 81 Similarly, many debate the WTO Dispute Settlement Body's impact on
the environment, human health, human rights, and numerous stakeholders. 82

74. ICJ Statute, supra note 22, art. 62.
75. Id. art. 63. The ICJ Statute provides that if states intervene under these circumstances, they are bound
by the Court's interpretation of the treaty.ld. This raises the interesting theoretical question of whether states
that do not intervene are also bound. Nonetheless, even if the ICJ Statute implies that they are not formally
bound, the court's interpretations will undoubtedly shape perceptions of state obligations under the treaty.

76. See C.M. Chinkin, Third-Party Intervention Before the International Court of Justice, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L. 495, 531 (1986) (arguing that the ICJ has "denied the mandatory language of Article 63 and
interpreted Article 62 so narrowly" that state intervention does not seem presently feasible); Sean D. Murphy,
AmplifYing the World Court's Jurisdiction Through Counter-Claims and Third-Party Intervention, 33 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REv. 5, 21-25 (2000) (discussing the few times that intervention has taken place at the ICJ).
77. Simma, supra note 5, at 573, 575-76.
78. ICSID in the Twenty-First Century: An Interview with Meg Kinnear, 104 AM. SOC'y INT'L L. PROC.
413, 424 (2010). Nonetheless, Secretary-General Kinnear asserted that ICSID is "not a facility that is
adjudicating human rights." Id.
79. Noemi Gal-Or, The Investor and Civil Society as Twin Global Citizens: Proposing a New
Interpretation in the Legitimacy Debate, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 271, 282 (2009).
80. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative & U.S. Dep't of State, 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty pmbl., http://www.ustr.gov/sites/defaultifilesIBIT%20text%20for''1020ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.
81. Id. arts. 12, 13,29.

82. See Gabrielle Marceau, The WTO Is Not a Closed Box, 100 AM. SOC'y INT'L L. PROC. 29, 30-31
(2006) (discussing how the WTO often considers nontrade concerns when resolving trade disputes, including
environmental, health, and religious factors); Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH.
L. REv. 1,32 (2005) (explaining how the WTO's consideration of health and environmental standards as they
relate to the world trade system affected governmental trade elites and businesses, as well as NGOs,
consumers, and citizens at large); Gary P. Sampson, Is There a Need for Restructuring the Collaboration
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Traditional approaches to legitimacy recognize neither the impact of international
courts on nonlitigants nor the changed role of international courts. International courts
do not just decide one-time disputes between states. Rather, much of the time they are
involved in advancing particular values or keeping states within a particular normative
community.83 A number of international court judges appear to perceive themselves as
advancing a set of values or creating communities around such values, not simply
resolving one-time disputes. When he served as president of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, Judge Thomas Buergenthal proposed that the court's purpose was to
create a "climate ... wherein human rights disputes can be depoliticised" and where
"governments learn to submit themselves to a Tribunal to have a case decided."84 He
emphasized, too, the importance "of judges whose integrity and commitment to human
rights is beyond question."85 Although he rejected the proposition that judges can be
policy-making activists, he suggested that "you can be an activist in terms of believing
that law plays an important role in resolving some of the societal problems that create
these terrible violations of human rights we've experienced."86 Similarly, former
ECHR Judge John Hedigan lauded the ECHR's role in promoting human rights
throughout Europe, as follows:
I think that the individual is the most precious form in society. The
relationship between the state and the citizen-the individual-lies at the
very heart of civilization. That they're treated with decency and respect, can
stand up and say their piece whenever they want, that they're not going to be
tortured, or abducted, or imprisoned for their views or their religion-these
are precious and vulnerable rights. I think the court is spreading those
standards all over Europe. The things that are happening in this regard, and
that have happened in Europe over the last half a century, are remarkable. 87
In the same vein, the ECJ has been an important force in the constitutionalization
of Europe. ECJ rulings "transformed the Treaty of Rome into a de facto constitution for
the European Community."88 Former president of the ECJ, Lord Mackenzie Stuart,
acknowledged the ECl's role in promoting European integration: "The foundation of

Among the WTO and UN Agencies so as To Harness Their Complementarities?, 7 J. Im'L ECON. L. 717, 721
(2004) (noting that "the WTO dispute settlement process finds itself dealing with cases relating to
nontraditional trade areas such as the environment and public health."); Mrujorie Cohn, The World Trade
Organization: Elevating Property Interests Above Human Rights, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 427, 431 (2001)
(describing how the WTO consistently rules in favor of big business rather than in the interest of protecting the
environment).

83. See Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106
AM. J. INT'L L. 225, 246 (2012) (explaining how international courts advance the goals of the institutional
regimes to which they are connected such as the European Union or WTO). Like domestic courts, international
ones are involved in "social control." SHAPIRO, supra note 27, at 22, 26. Martin Shapiro proposes that courts
have moved away from the ideal type of two litigants choosing a third person to resolve their disputes. Id. at I.
Rather, courts-and judges-are associated with the imposition of particular substantive norms of those ruling
the broader society. Id. at 22, 26. "Thus a major function of courts in many societies is a particular form of
social control, the recruiting of support for the regime." Id. at 22.
84. STURGESS & CHUBB, supra note 34, at 534.
85. Id.

86. Id. at 118-19.
87. TERRIS ET AL., supra note 32, at 220 (emphasis added).
88. Alter & Helfer, supra note 36, at 564.
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the Community is an act of political will and if, from time to time, it is lacking, the
court may, by an interpretive process here and there, deblock negotiations."89 It is
remarkable how explicit these judges are in recognizing their role in creating
communities and promoting norms.
Although this Article focuses on noncriminal courts, examples abound in the
realm of international criminal law as well. For example, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTy) has justified at least two decisions in light
of the purposes of international humanitarian law. The ICTY Appellate Chamber
rejected the defense of duress in a case involving crimes against humanity partly to
effectuate the goals of international humanitarian law. 9o When faced with a question
with no clear legal answer, it "assert[ ed] an absolute moral postulate which is clear and
unmistakable for the implementation of international humanitarian law."91 Similarly,
the ICTY Appellate Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadi(;92 noted that its decision to
characterize the conflict in Bosnia as "international" was "borne out by the entire logic
of international humanitarian law,"93 which it further noted is "a realistic body of law,
grounded on the notion of effectiveness and inspired by the aim of deterring deviation
from its standards to the maximum extent possible."94 The underlying goals of the body
oflaw at issue were a driving force in the ICTY's decision making.
2.

Why These Changes Render Traditional Approaches Anachronistic

International courts shape the law prospectively and affect actors beyond the
litigants immediately before the court. They are engaged in perpetuating values and
maintaining normative communities. These acknowledged realities of international
adjudication mandate taking a second look at traditional approaches to legitimacy such
as consent and procedural fairness to litigants alone.
The state consent approach is flawed because it assumes international courts'
exclusive role is to decide one-time disputes involving states and that a decision's
impact is limited to the litigating parties. The state consent approach supposes that
states are sovereign and independent, and therefore no court can judge them without
their consent. Yet international court decisions affect nonlitigating states. Various
89. STURGESS & CHUBB, supra note 34, at 494. Lord Stuart also noted that the court did so when it
indicated it was unnecessary for the council to issue "directives about free movement of persons because the
right was a fundamental one already inscribed in the Treaty." Id. He noted, however, that "it is a dangerous
tendency ... to think that the court can do more than it really can." Id.
90. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgement of the Appeals Chamber, ~ 4, 19 (lnt'!
Crim. Trib. for the Fonner Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint
Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, ~ 80, 83 (lnt'l Crim. Trib. for the Fonner
Yugoslavia Oct. 7,1997).
91. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah,
~ 80, 83 (emphasis added). The Judgment of the Appeals Chamber incorporates the reasoning of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah's joint separate opinion on the issue of whether duress constitutes a complete
defense to a charge of crimes against humanity. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgement of the Appeals
Chamber, ~ 19.
92. Case No. IT-94-I-A, Judgement of the Appeals Chamber, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Fonner
Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
93. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Judgement of the Appeals Chamber, ~ 96.
94.Id.
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international judges like those quoted above appear to see themselves as responsible for
establishing and maintaining a kind of international rule of law. Courts routinely
change the international legal obligations of nonlitigating states even if those states did
not consent to jurisdiction. Even if the relevant treaty allows a state to opt out of
compulsory jurisdiction, a decision can still be used as a focal point for domestic and
international actors to pressure the state. Under the traditional state consent approach,
making new law applicable to all states should render a court illegitimate. But if a
court's job is to promote human rights, then a decision that promotes human rights may
be legitimacy enhancing, regardless or even because of its impact on nonlitigating
states.
The state consent approach to legitimacy is flawed for another reason. Nonstate
actors' rights and duties may be directly affected by international courts, yet their
consent appears irrelevant. The traditional story is that states were the only subjects, or
legal persons, addressed by intemational law. Only states could possess rights and
duties to the exclusion of nonstate actors. 95 Other legal persons are widely recognized
today, such as international organizations,96 individuals,97 and corporations. 98 State
consent to jurisdiction matters to legitimacy, at least in part, because adjudication
affects states' rights and obligations. But even when adjudication affects a nonstate
actor's rights and obligations, the nonstate actor plays no role in consenting to its
jurisdiction. Although states presumably represent their people when they decide to
join a dispute resolution regime, some states are undemocratic, barely democratic, or
represent only the views of empowered elites. Even in representative states, people's
views may change over time, and it may be impractical or impossible for a state to
95. JANNE ELISABETH NUMAN, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (2005).
96. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J.
174, 187 (Apr. II) (holding that the United Nations, acting as an organization, may pursue an international
claim against a state government to obtain reparations for damage suffered); Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties Between States and International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543; Responsibility of
International Organizations, Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 63d Sess., Apr. 26-June 3, July 4-Aug. 12,2011,
U.N. Doc. N66/10; GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2011) (discussing the responsibilities of international
organizations under international law).
97. See THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANlZATION OF INTERNATlONAL LAW I (2006) (describing the impact
of human rights and humanitarian law on many other parts of international law and asserting that "[t]he
humanization of public international law under the impact of human rights has shifted its focus above all from
State-centered to individual-centered"); MARIo PROST, THE CONCEPT OF UNITY IN PUBLIC iNTERNATIONAL
LAW 5 (2012) (describing the shift of the role of individuals in international law from "mere objects" to
"holders of international rights that are actionable in court"). International human rights law bestows
individuals with a panoply of rights. American Convention on Human Rights arts. 4, 5, 6, Nov. 22,1969,1144
U.N.T.S. 123; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 57, arts. 18,21; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights arts. 6, II, 15, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,993 U.N.T.S. 3;
ECHR, supra note 24, arts. 3, 9. Also, individuals have standing to pursue claims against states for violating
human rights treaties. E.g., Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, O.A.S. Res. 447 (IX0/79) (1979); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 24, arts.
19-51; Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African
Court of Human and People's Rights art. 30, June 9, 1998, Doc. OAUILEGIEXP/AFCHPRlPROT(III).
98. For example, corporations have the right to sue states in NAFTA and ICSID. ICSID Convention,
supra note 23, art. 25; North American Free Trade Agreement ch. XI, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289; PROST, supra note 97, at 5.

78

TEMPLE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 86

disentangle itself from a dispute resolution system. If a state consented fifty years ago,
does that confer legitimacy on a court today? The consent principle has itself lost force,
and many scholars of international legitimacy believe it is at most a weak basis for the
legitimacy of international institutions. 99
Although his focus is on domestic courts, perhaps Martin Shapiro provides an
alternative formulation of this critique. Shapiro declared that domestic courts rarely
conform to the ideal type of "(1) an independent judge applying (2) preexisting legal
norms after (3) adversary proceedings in order to achieve (4) a dichotomous decision in
which one of the parties was assigned the legal right and the other found wrong."IOO
Instead, he argues that consent and the independent judge have been replaced by
judicial office and law. lol In other words, individuals no longer choose the adjudicator
and rules to be applied, but rather, they are subject to society's choice of adjudicator as
well as society's values and preferences as expressed by its laws. The same goes for
international courts. Consent becomes less meaningful as the foundation of
international courts' legitimacy when jurisdiction is essentially compulsory or consent
was expressed fifty years ago. And international courts may promote values that
diverge from what states consented to in the first place. The point is that while state
consent may matter for legitimacy, it is an insufficient basis for legitimacy standing on
its own.
The procedural fairness to litigants approach to legitimacy, too, is difficult to
reconcile with the realities of international adjudication. Again, international court
decisions affect nonJitigants. Yet the procedural fairness approach as traditionally
understood leaves no role for them. Taking the most extreme example, imagine an
individual whose rights and duties under international law are being adjudicated by the
decision of an international court. Assume the individual has no standing, has no right
to file an amicus brief, and proceedings are closed to the public. If all other
requirements are met, such a court is legitimate according to the traditional procedural
fairness approach. The focus on procedural fairness to litigants alone leaves an
enormous blind spot in assessments of normative legitimacy.
The procedural fairness approach assumes the existence of neutral or impartial
adjudicators and benches or panels of adjudicators. Such adjudicators presumably view
facts objectively, favor neither party to a dispute, and have no goals besides dispute
resolution. Yet the reality is that adjudicators introduce outside interests into
adjudication all the time, such as those of the institution or actor that appoints them. 102

99. Cesare P.R. Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in International
Adjudication: Elementsfor a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 791, 794-95 (2007); Meyer &
Sanklecha, supra note 13, at 4-5; Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples
Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191, 208 (2000); Allen
Buchanan, The Legitimacy of International Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 79, 90--91
(Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010); Wolfrum, supra note 16, at 9; Tasioulas, supra note 13, at
20--21.
100. SHAPIRO, supra note 27, at I.
101. Id. at 18.
102. Martin Shapiro discusses these interests in the domestic context:
When the two parties must go to a third who is an officer, it is as evident to them as to the observer
that they are no longer going to a disinterested third. Instead they are introducing a third interest:
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These may include preservation of power relationships, human rights or free trade
promotion, protection of state sovereignty, environmental concerns, and favoring
peaceful conflict resolution over justice, or vice versa. Judges' professional and
personal identities and goals may also influence adjudicatory outcomes. 103 A
nearsighted focus on procedural fairness solely to litigants ignores the recognized and
evolving roles, objectives, and impacts of international courts.
III. A NEW APPROACH TO NORMATIVE LEGITIMACY

The traditional approach to normative legitimacy for international courts is deeply
flawed. State consent and procedural fairness to litigants alone are insufficient to
ground the legitimacy of international courts. Yet crafting a new approach presents
daunting challenges. First, such a theory must recognize the new realities of
international adjudication, including that international adjudication affects the rights,
responsibilities, and interests of nonlitigating states and nonstate actors, and
international courts do not solely decide one-time disputes but rather are involved in
creating norms over time. Merely acknowledging in a footnote that states are no longer
the sole subjects of international law is insufficient. 104 The theory must incorporate
these realities to be useful. "Prescription aims at a particular normative goal, but it must
take into account present reality in order to achieve that goal."105
Simultaneously, despite all the changes in the role of nonstate actors in the
international system and the growing implications of international court proceedings
for nonlitigants, the theory must still recognize that states may withdraw their consent
to jurisdiction from many international courts or simply stop using them if it becomes
unduly burdensome to do so. The theory must be sensitive to the practical reality that
states continue to playa pivotal role in the success of international dispute resolution.
Without states, there would be no international courts. As Lukas H. Meyer and Pranay
Sanklecha point out, if a normative theory fails to take into account empirical realities,
its principles are useless ("practical irrelevance").106 Yet giving politics the upper hand
in crafting normative theory may result in the endorsement of injustice ("adaptive
preference"). 107 This Article seeks to strike some imperfect balance between the two.
A second challenge to building a coherent theory is the diversity of the dozens of
international courts operating today. They differ on the breadth of their subject matter

that of the government, the church, the landowner, or whoever else appoints the official.
Id.
103. See, e.g., Nienke Grossman, Sex on the Bench: Do Women Judges Matter to the Legitimacy of
International Courts?, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 647, 656-{;0 (2012) (suggesting that judges' gender may, at times,
influence their decision making).
104. See, e.g., FERNANDO R. TEs6N, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW I (1998) ("Although it is
understandably hard for lawyers to forsake the statist assumptions of classic international legal discourse, new
times call for a fresh conceptual and ethical language."); Meyer & Sanklecha, supra note 13, at 14 (arguing
that an exclusive focus on states seems "at the least, incomplete, leading naturally to the question of how to
accommodate the widened range of actors within any systematic explanation of what justice (and legitimacy)
involve at the international level").
105. Bodansky, supra note 9, at 314.

106. Meyer &. Sanklecha, supra note 13, at 19.
107. Id.
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jurisdiction, whether their jurisdiction is compulsory, the standing they afford to
nonstate actors, the transparency of their procedures, and the availability of
enforcement mechanisms. And "[w]hat is required in order to legitimise an institution
may vary depending on how much authority it is exercising, the kind of authority it is
exercising, and the kinds of issues it is exercising authority over."108 Consequently, a
theoretical framework must be broad enough to accommodate the various courts within
its scope, yet narrow and concrete enough to be useful. The goal, after all, is to be able
to use the theory to evaluate the legitimacy of various international courts, to learn
from the differences among courts, and to craft legitimacy-enhancing institutional
reforms.
A third challenge to creating a theory of justified authority for international courts
is the scarcity of universal objective principles in a world of seven billion people.
Normative legitimacy is supposed to be grounded in objective principles, while
sociological legitimacy depends on perceptions and is agent relative. 109 State consent is
an attractive source of legitimacy because it allows states to choose for themselves
what values they will ascribe to. To the extent the theory grapples with the relationship
between the justice of institutional outputs and legitimacy, it must acknowledge the
narrowness of consensus on the meaning of ''justice.''11O Further, a theory of normative
legitimacy should also acknowledge that such a consensus may change over time. I II
A fourth hurdle is distinguishing between what matters to legitimacy and what is
simply good policy for reasons unrelated to legitimacy. What underpins legitimacy, as
opposed to the rule of law, justice, or something else? One way that scholars have
systematically approached legitimacy theory is by examining it through the lens of
inputs, process, and outputs. State consent and procedural fairness to litigants fall into
the input and process categories, respectively, while justice is linked to outputs. I 12 This
Article proposes both procedural and substantive requirements for legitimacy.
Despite these and other challenges, building a new theory is vital. Applying an
outmoded approach to legitimacy engenders a false sense of security about
international courts' health and viability. Also, enough commonality exists among
international courts to merit a fieldwide theory. At the highest level of generality, all of
these institutions were created by states to assist in the resolution of disputes governed
by international law. They are staffed by nationally diverse persons who are
knowledgeable in international law. They fmd facts, identify and interpret relevant
rules, fill in gaps in the law when necessary, and apply rules to facts. Building a theory
of legitimacy that spans international courts can push scholars and court reformers to
think more broadly and deeply about international adjudication. Further, it can

108. Bodansky, supra note 9, at 316.
109. E.g., Bodansky, supra note 8, at 601; Grossman, supra note 10, at 115-16.

110. See Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 7, at 412 (discussing disagreement on the meaning of
·~ustice").

III. Alternatively, one could disregard whatever consensus exists on the meaning of justice and attempt
to deduce ftrst principles independently of consensus. This Article prefers to rely on states' common
understanding to avoid charges of "practical irrelevance," while remaining aware of the risk. Meyer &
Sanklecha, supra note 13, at 19. Further, virtually all universally held beliefs about justice are likely to reflect
ftrst principles to some extent.
112. E.g., Wolfrum, supra note 16, at 6-7.
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encourage the imagination and evaluation of institutional reforms, which may enhance
these institutions' legitimacy. Without legitimacy, international courts, especially those
with weak enforcement mechanisms, are doomed to irrelevance and ineffectiveness.
In spite of the difficulties in crafting a new theory of normative legitimacy, this
Section proposes one. First, Part lIlA sets forth a broader vision of procedural fairness
that includes both stakeholders and rights holders. The remainder of Section III
describes substantive requirements; Part III.B discusses justice, while Part IILC is
concerned with faithfulness to the object and purpose of the norms being interpreted
and applied. The hope is that this theory will serve as a starting point for future debate
and discussion about the normative legitimacy of international courts.

A.

Reimagining Procedural Fairness

Legitimacy requires that international courts allow nonlitigants to participate in
international court proceedings in at least two instances. First, when an international
court is deciding a dispute that adjudicates a nonlitigant's international rights and
obligations, the nonlitigant must have a fair and impartial hearing. Widely recognized
notions of due process support this proposition. Second, when an international court is
either acting as an organ of global administrative law or is making law, nonlitigating
stakeholders whose interests are implicated must have the opportunity to influence
outcomes. This argument is grounded in democratic theory.
1.

Right to a Hearing in Dispute Resolution Proceedings

Courts must be procedurally fair to be legitimate. The hallmark of procedural
fairness is affording an impartial hearing to those whose rights and duties are at issue.
There is no difference in adjudication at the domestic and international levels that
necessitates a different rule at the international level, except when one of the litigants
adopts the views of a third~party entitlement holder. Individuals in particular have a
strong basis in international human rights law for the right to a fair and impartial
hearing when their rights and obligations are being adjudicated at the international
level. Nonetheless, international courts must grant hearings only if a legal person can
show that its rights or duties are being adjudicated by the court in the pending dispute
and there is broad consensus as to the existence and scope of those rights and duties.

a.

International versus domestic courts and the right to a hearing

Procedural fairness is an integral part of legitimate adjudication because it allows
open-minded judges to consider equally the views of the parties whose rights and
duties are at stake. Conversely, it provides entitlement holders equal opportunities to
attempt to influence the outcome in a case that directly implicates them. There is no
difference in the adjudicative function at the international and domestic levels that
justifies a different relationship between procedural fairness and legitimate adjudication
at the international level. 113 Both an international court deciding the course of a

113. See Paul Mahoney, The international Judiciary - Independence and Accountability, 7 L. & PRAC.
INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 313, 317 (2008) (making an analogous argument about judicial independence at the
national and intemationallevels).
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maritime boundary among three states and a domestic court deciding the property line
between three houses must provide all sides with equal and unbiased opportunities to
present their arguments. The ICI has itself recognized the importance of including all
states whose rights and duties are necessarily adjudicated in a particular case. In
Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United Kingdom,
Northern Ireland, and United States),114 the ICI dismissed Italian claims for want of
jurisdiction because adjudication required a determination of Albania's international
legal responsibility, and Albania had not consented to the court's jurisdiction. Jl5
Whether the court is international or domestic or whether states or nonstate actors are
involved is irrelevant. What matters is that a judicial institution is deciding a dispute
among a set of entitlement holders, and all of them must be heard for the procedural
fairness requirement to be met. If a court refuses to listen to one of them, its legitimacy
is in peril.
A state's ability to access and participate in judicial proceedings on behalf of its
nationals does not obviate the need for nonstate actors to represent themselves. First,
there is no guarantee that their views will be represented. Governments may be
undemocratic, unrepresentative, or even if democratic, guided by a small subset of
elites with unique interests far removed from those of much of the population. Also,
there may be transnational groups with rights being adjudicated in a dispute who are
not represented by a state. For example, imagine a border dispute involving two states
and a people who lives in both states but constitutes a majority in neither. Neither state
may choose to represent that people's views during litigation. Procedural fairness
requires that those whose entitlements are being adjudicated have the opportunity to
advocate for their rights.
Nonetheless, if an entitlement holder's position is being represented by a
litigant-if it adopts the entitlement holder's views-then procedural fairness does not
require a separate hearing. For example, if Georgia files suit against Russia in the ICI
for violations of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, then
those allegedly suffering racial discrimination as a result of Russia's conduct need no
separate hearing. Georgia is representing their views directly. In other words,
procedural fairness requires a third-party hearing only if the state refuses to or cannot
make the entitlement holder's case in its own presentation to the international court.
h.

The right to a hearing for individuals

Additionally, the right to an impartial hearing for individuals, as opposed to other
subjects of international law, can be grounded in international human rights law.
Several widely ratified international treaties and customary international law require
states to provide persons whose rights are being adjudicated with an impartial hearing
in the domestic context or due process rights. Global and regional treaties and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights seek to guarantee the right of individuals to
access and participate in judicial proceedings when their rights and obligations are at
issue. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (lCCPR) provides that
114. Preliminary Question, 1954I.C.J. 19 (June 15).

115. See Monetary Gold, 1954 I.C.J at 32-33 ("To adjudicate upon the international responsibility of
Albania without her consent would run counter to a well-established principle of international law.").
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"[i]n the detennination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and
obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law."116 The right to a fair
hearing is of such high stature that the Human Rights Committee, the expert body
charged with the ICCPR's interpretation, considers reservations to it inconsistent with
the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole. 117 Similarly, the American Convention
on Human Rights states:
Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a
reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal,
previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a
criminal nature made against him or for the detennination of his rights and
obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.118
The European Convention provides: "In the detennination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law."\l9 The African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
states that "[e]very individual shall have the right to have his cause heard."120 This right
includes "the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating
his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations
and customs in force" and "the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial
court or tribunal."121 The Convention on the Rights of the Child, too, grants a child the
right to express his or her views "freely in all matters affecting the child," and to this
end, "the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial
and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a
representative or an appropriate body."122
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, too, supports the proposition that
individuals should have the opportunity to participate in the adjudication of their rights.
It provides that every person is entitled to "a fair and public hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal, in the detennination of his rights and obligations and of any
criminal charge against him."123 The Universal Declaration has the status of customary
international law and is an authoritative interpretation of the human rights provisions of

116. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 57, art. 14. One hundred sixtyseven states are parties to this treaty. United Nations, Status of Treaties, International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights I, http://treaties.un.orgidoclPublicationlMTDSGNolurne%20IlChapter''1o20IVIIV-4.en.pdf.
117. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 32, ~ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/GC/32 (Aug.
23, 2007) ("[AJ general reservation to the right to a fair trial would be incompatible with the object and
purpose of the Covenant.").
118. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 97, art. 8(1).
119. ECHR, supra note 24, art. 6(1).
120. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 7, June 27,1981,1520 U.N.T.S. 217.
121. [d.
122. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 12, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. One
hundred ninety-three states are parties to this convention. United Nation, Status of Treaties, Convention on the
Rights of the Child I, http://treaties.un.orgldoclPublicationlMTDSGNolume%20IlChapter%20NIIVIl.en.pdf.
123. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 57, art. 10.
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the United Nations Charter. 124
Although these instruments generally refer to the right of individuals to a fair and
impartial hearing in a national court or tribunal, there is no difference in the
adjudicative function that justifies limiting the right to a fair and impartial hearing only
to those whose rights are being adjudicated domestically.125 Again, litigants may not
represent the views of other entitlement holders. Further, it is difficult to argue against
the proposition that international adjudication should meet minimum due process
requirements found in human rights instruments. 126 In this vein, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights urges the progressive implementation of measures
"national and international" to secure the observance of human rights, which include
the right to a fair hearing. 127 Just as legitimacy at the domestic level requires
participation of those whose rights and duties are being adjudicated, so too does
legitimacy at the international level. Giving courts authority to adjudicate the rights and
obligations of voiceless rights holders is a serious threat to their legitimacy and fails to
account for the wide recognition of individuals as subjects of international law. When
international courts adjudicate the rights and duties of individuals, basic notions of due
process and international human rights law require the provision of some sort of
hearing.
c.

What kind a/right requires a hearing?

Procedural fairness requires a hearing only if the legal person can show that its
international rights or duties are being adjudicated by the court in the pending dispute,
and there is broad consensus as to the existence and scope of those rights and duties.
Individuals possess a wide range of rights under the laws of their own states, as
well as rights and duties derived from various areas of international law, including
human rights, investment, and criminal law. Only when an international court is
adjudicating a person's entitlements under international law is a hearing in an
international court necessary. Domestic courts are best poised to interpret their own law
because of their knowledge and experience. Also, international courts lack the authority
to make judgments concerning violations of domestic law. For example, no hearing is
required for an individual at the international level because her domestic civil rights are
potentially harmed by the decision of an international court. Concretely, individuals in
Uruguay and Argentina would have no right to a hearing before the ICJ in the Pulp

124. Antonio Augusto Cancado Trinidade, Introductory Note, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Audiovisual Library of International Law, http://legal.un.orglavl/ha/udhr/udhr.html; Thomas M. Franck, The
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 61 (1992).

125. See Mahoney, supra note 113, at 317 (arguing that there is "no discernible reason" that the
principles governing domestic adjudicative bodies would not govern international adjudicative bodies).
126. KLABBERS ET AL., supra note 15, at 128. Although this argument is frequently made in international
criminal court circles, it is virtually absent in international civil court ones. See, e.g., David Luban, Fairness to
Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law 13-16 (Georgetown Univ.
Law Ctr., Working Paper No. 67, 2008) (discussing the link between legitimacy and procedural fairness on
international criminal tribunals).
127. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 57, pmbl., art. 10. Article 28 provides that
"[ e]veryone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration can be fully realized." Id. art. 28.
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Mills case unless they could allege a violation of individual international legal rights.
Procedural fairness does not require international courts to afford a hearing to someone
whose domestic legal rights alone are at issue.
A person can demand a hearing under this theory only if he or she can show broad
consensus regarding the existence and scope of the asserted international legal right or
duty. By requiring those who seek a hearing to demonstrate that the right or duty
asserted is accepted by a significant majority of the international community, or the
relevant regional community of states, international courts cannot be charged with
applying unfair or unknown standards to state behavior. For example, clarity and
consensus are lacking concerning the meaning and legal status of several purported
rights. Numerous international human rights instruments layout dozens of rights, often
with vague and aspirational language. Not all states have ratified all the relevant
treaties, and many have made numerous reservations. Saudi Arabia's understanding of
human rights may be very different from Norway's. Also, their understandings may
change over time. To decide if broad consensus exists about the existence and scope of
a right, a court could look at the number of states that are parties to treaties establishing
the right and reservations to it, commentary by authoritative treaty bodies, state
practice, opinions of relevant regional and state courts, statements by states and experts
in the field, and resolutions passed in international organizations.
These factors strictly limit the situations in which a legal person can obtain a
hearing. Two examples are useful to understand the circumstances in which a hearing is
required. Take a border dispute between two countries where an ethnic minority spans
the border. If the international court decides on the course of the border, it will de facto
adjudicate the right of self-determination of the minority group. If neither state chooses
to argue the position of the ethnic minority, and broad consensus exists concerning the
status and core meaning of the right to self-determination, then the minority group must
have a right to be heard during the course of the adjudication.
What about the Chevron-Ecuador litigation?128 Employing the approach set forth
in this Part, the PCA would have needed to determine whether that litigation would de
facto adjudicate the international legal rights of indigenous peoples. The PCA would
consider a number of factors, including whether consensus exists as to the scope of the
international legal rights allegedly at issue. Also, if Ecuador is adopting the same
arguments as the indigenous peoples seeking a hearing as part of its response to the
litigation, then the PCA could reject their request for a hearing. These can be high bars.
H is difficult to make a judgment as to how a court might come out with respect to
Fundaci6n Pachamama and the International Institute for Sustainable Development,
two NGOs that submitted petitions for participation as amici in the jurisdictional phase
of the litigation, because the petitions were not drafted with these standards in mind. 129
Nonetheless, they argue that a decision of the PCA could affect indigenous peoples'
international legal rights to access justice. 130

128. See supra notes 6()-{)7 and accompanying text for a discussion of Chevron v. Ecuador.
129. See supra note 6S---{)6 and accompanying text for an explanation of the right to file amicus curiae
briefs during the jurisdictional phase.
130. Brief for Fundaci6n Pachamama and the International Institute for Sustainable Development as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 67, ~ 4.8
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What kind ofhearing is required?

Let us assume that an individual meets the narrow threshold requirements to
obtain a hearing in an ongoing dispute being adjudicated by an international court.
What kind of hearing is required? Individuals must be afforded an opportunity to
present views about the implications of the case for their rights and to have an impartial
court address those views in its decision making. More specifically, individuals must
have the chance to provide their perspectives to the court on how international law
relevant to their rights and duties constrains the actions of the litigating parties.
In order to present views, persons must have access to both the oral and written
pleadings of the parties at the time they are presented to the court in a language
accessible to them. They must be permitted to attend hearings of the court and review
any decisions the court has made in the case. The court could decide whether to allow
the presentation of views in writing or orally.
The right to a hearing is meaningless without an impartial tribunal. Judges'
identities, how and by whom they were appointed, their education, their professional
reputation, and whether they hope to secure appointments in the future may influence
judicial decision making.!3! What would a court impartial to both states and other
rights holders look like? If only states are involved in judicial selection, judges may
prize states' rights over individual ones, or they may have a narrower view of which
kinds of rights should receive the attention of international courts. States could modify
the qualifications requirements for international judges, draft new judicial oaths of
impartiality, or create nominating committees for international courts that include
nonstate actors. They could include, or continue to include, representativeness
requirements within courts' statutes.!32 They could also allow individuals the right to
name their own judge to a tribunal.
Other models are possible. The point is that once it is recognized that nonlitigants'
rights and duties are being adjudicated in international courts, they must have the
opportunity to present their views to an impartial tribunal to satisfy the procedural
fairness requirements of legitimacy.

e.

What if a conflict arises?

In the narrow circumstances where a nonstate third party may have rights being
adjudicated in an international court proceeding, how should a court address the new
party's concerns? States have a wide range of obligations to each other that touch on
different substantive areas of international law such as trade, use of force,
environmental law, and human rights law. At the same time, these obligations are
intended to regulate states' conduct with respect to other states, as well as other
international legal persons, such as individuals, corporations, and sometimes
international organizations. What if these obligations conflict? Should some obligations

131. E.g., Simma, supra note 5, at 576-77 (sensing "a bit of reticence ... vis-a-vis human rights" in the
foreign investment and arbitration profession and questioning whether it "might be in the investment
arbitrators' genes" because most have a private or commercial rather than public law background).
132. See Grossman, supra note 105, at 668-70 (discussing sex representativeness requirements on
various international courts).
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take precedence over others? As the 2S6-page Report of the Study Group of the
International Law Commission on Fragmentation of International Law demonstrates,
these are complex questions that merit further study and reflection. 133 At a minimum,
this Article proposes in Part III.B that international courts must prize some core set of
human rights above all other obligations of the state.
2.

Stakeholder Participation in Judicial Law or Policy Making

Must international courts provide the opportunity to participate to those who have
interests in what direction law or policy takes, but no specific right or duty being
adjudicated in any particular dispute? Because state consent and procedural fairness to
litigants alone are insufficient to justify the authority of international courts engaging in
law or policy making, one way international courts can justify their authority is by
providing stakeholders with participation rights.
Democratic theory can provide a justification for the exercise of public authority
of international COurtS. 134 Democratic models are many and varied, but they generally
include elements of representation, participation, accountability, and deliberation. 135
Although one could analyze the applicability and role of all of these elements in
justifying the authority of international courts, this Article limits itself to a discussion
of one of the most fundamental "building block[s] of democracy"-participation by
those affected. 136 Participation in the conduct of public affairs is an integral part of
democracy. "[D]emocracy requires that all those whose basic interests are affected by
policy decisions are able to participate directly or indirectly in the process of making
them."137 Participation not only allows those affected to influence judicial processes,
but it also provides opportunities to monitor what is taking place and to utilize
mechanisms of control and accountability outside the courthouse.
But how does one justify the application of this democratic principle to
international institutions and to international courts in particular? Different states have
different approaches to governance. Even if one ascribes to democracy at the domestic
level, it does not easily or automatically apply at the international one. For example, the
demos is more readily identifiable at the state level but not necessarily at the
international one. 138 Further, democratic principles are generally applied to political

133. See generally Fragmentation o/International Law: Difficulties Arisingfrom the Diversification and
Expansion o/International Law, Rep. of the Study Group of the Int'I Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., May I-June 9,
July 3-Aug. 11,2006, U.N. Doc. AlCN.4fL.682; GAOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. IO (2006).
134. See Annin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, On the Democratic Legitimation 0/ International
Judicial Lawmaking, 12 GERMAN LJ. 1341, 1343 (2011) (contending that "(dJemocratic justification is
ineluctable for the exercise of any public authority").
135. See Grliinne De Burca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
221,227 (2008) (discussing participation and representation of affected parties); J.H.H. Weiler, The Geology
0/ International Law - Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy, 64 Heidelberg J. Int'I L. 547, 560 (2004)
(referencing representation, accountability, and deliberation as democratic values).
136. De Burca, supra note 135, at 227.
137. Samantha Besson, Institutionalising Global Demoi-cracy, in LEGITIMACY, JUSTICE AND PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 13, at 66, 66.
138. See Weiler, supra note 135, at 560 (asserting that while a demos is presumed in states, there is no
clear demos at the international level).
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institutions such as legislatures, not to courts. Finally, applying democratic principles
to international institutions may fail to recognize that international institutions lack the
social and political conditions for democracy at the domestic level, such as an
individual right to vote, majoritarian decision making, a global public in constant
communication over public issues, free press and media, and institutions to check
abuses of power. 139 These arguments may explain why so few have grappled with the
democratic legitimacy of international tribunals. 14o
As this Part argues, despite differences in state approaches to governance,
numerous global and regional treaties and soft law instruments support the proposition
that individuals, and sometimes even NGOs, have a right to take part in the conduct of
public affairs. Undemocratic and unrepresentative states, as well as transnational
constituencies, make it necessary to effectuate opportunities for participation at the
international level, although these instruments generally refer to the domestic one. The
activities of international courts are close enough to the conduct of public affairs, at
least some of the time, to necessitate some kind of democratic justification. Further,
because international courts are not embedded in a constitutional framework, the need
for democratic justification is particularly salient. A number of institutional changes are
necessary to bring about participation at the international court level.
Importantly, the objective is not to recreate domestic democracy at the
international level to achieve legitimacy, nor to apply the principles of domestic
democracy in the same way to international courts as to domestic legislatures. For
example, participation may not take the same form at the domestic and international
levels. It may apply to different kinds of institutions in different ways. Instead, the goal
is to find some way to legitimate the power of institutions that exercise authority over
both state and nonstate actors, yet where the latter may play no role whatsoever in
decision-making processes. In 1.H.H. Weiler's words:
What is required is both a rethinking of the very building blocks of
democracy to see how these mayor may not be employed in an international
system which is neither State nor Nation and to search for alternative
legitimating devices which would make up for the non applicability of some
of the classical institutions of democracy where that is not possible.1 41
Participation in the conduct of public affairs is one such building block. 142
a.

Participation in the conduct ofpublic affairs

Not only democratic theory discusses the importance of the participation of those
affected in the formulation of policies that impact them. Numerous global and regional
international treaties and soft law instruments articulate a right to take part in the
conduct of public affairs. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

139. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 7, at 416.
140. See KLABBERS ET AL., supra note 15, at 150. But see von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 14, at
979.
141. Weiler, supra note 135, at 561.
142. See De BUrca, supra note 135, at 227 (identifying the "fullest possible participation and
representation of those affected' as "one particular building block of democracy").
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provides that governments should reflect the "will of the people,"143 and that
"[e]veryone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or
through freely chosen representatives" and "the right of equal access to public service
in his country."I44 The ICCPR similarly states that "[e]very citizen shall have the right
and the opportunity . . . [t]o take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives."145 The Human Rights Committee described this
article of the ICCPR as addressing "the right of individuals to participate in those
processes which constitute the conduct of public affairs."146 It noted that the conduct of
public affairs is "a broad concept which relates to the exercise of political power, in
particular the exercise of legislative, executive and administrative powers. It covers all
aspects of public administration, and the formulation and implementation of policy at
international, national, regional and locallevels."147
Regional human rights treaties as well as International Labour Organization
Convention 169 recognize the importance of the right to participate in public affairs.
For example, the American Convention on Human Rights states that every citizen has
the right to "take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives."148 The African Charter contains similar language. 149 International
Labour Organization Convention 169 also imposes obligations on states to consult
indigenous peoples in formulating policies that concern them. For example, it states
that governments must "consult the peoples concerned ... whenever consideration is
being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly"
and must "establish means by which these peoples can freely participate, to at least the
same extent as other sectors of the population, at all levels of decision-making in
elective institutions and administrative and other bodies responsible for policies and
programmes which concern them."150
The international community has put special emphasis on the right to participate
in policy making with environmental consequences. For example, Principle 10 of the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development states that:
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall
have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is
held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and
activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision143. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 57, art. 21.
144. ld.
145. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 57, art. 25.
146. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 25, The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting
Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, ~ 2, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/21/Rev.lIAdd.7 (July 12,
1996).
147. ld. ~ 5.
148. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 97, art. 23.
149. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 120, art. 13.
ISO. International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169) art. 6,
adopted June 27,1989,28 I.L.M. 1382. The convention grants peoples the right to participate in policy making
that may affect them directly. ld. art. 7. Indigenous peoples are to have access to legal proceedings for the
protection of their rights. !d. art. 12. Also, the treaty states that a primary goal of education of indigenous
children is to help them participate in both their own and national communities.ld. art. 29.
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making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and
participation by making information widely available. Effective access to
judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall
be provided. 151
The United Nations Environment Programme developed draft guidelines for the
implementation of Principle 10 in 2010. These guidelines provide that states must
ensure that members of the public, including both individuals and NGOs, have the
opportunity to participate meaningfully in environmental decision making and be
informed of this opportunity.152 The United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe's Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decisionmaking and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, commonly known as the
Aarhus Convention, contains many similar provisions. 153 Although the guidelines and
the convention are limited to environmental decision-making processes, they are
significant because they enshrine the right of both individuals and NGOs to seek to
influence policy making and to access and use courts to vindicate their rights.
Although these instruments usually, although not exclusively, refer to
participation in national policy making, the point is that individuals have a right to take
part in the formulation and implementation of policies that affect them. If states were
truly representative, perhaps it would be unnecessary to give effect to such a right at the
international level. States would represent their people, and there would be no need for
"interference" by nonstate actors, except perhaps for transnational constituencies. Yet
because many states are unrepresentative, undemocratic, or captured by powerful elites,
individuals and other nonstate actors frequently have no ability to influence policy
making or administration taking place in international courts, even if it impacts their
interests directly. The failure to include individuals who are affected threatens
international courts' legitimacy. It excludes from the purview of policyrnakers or
administrators the voices of those whose lives may be most deeply altered by the
policies they craft.
b.

International courts and the conduct o/public affairs

Participation in the conduct of public affairs is generally understood in relation to
the exercise of political power and administration. 154 This Part proposes that the
activities of international courts, at least some of the time, fall within these categories.

lSI. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14,
1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A1CONF.151/26IRev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I
(Aug. 12, 1992).
152. Governing Council of the V.N. Env't Programme, Guidelines for the Development of National
Legislation on Access to Information, Guideline 8, adopted by the Governing Council in decision SS.xIl5, part
A (Feb 26, 2010).
153. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters arts. 1,3,9, June 25,1998,2161 V.N.T.S. 447 (forty-five parties as of May
15,2012).
154. See The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to
Public Service, supra note 146, ~ 25 (providing for "the free communication of information and ideas about
public and political issues between citizens, candidates and elected representatives is essential" to enjoy
freedom to engage in political activity).
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Further, international courts are generally not embedded in a constitutional system of
checks and balances, so participation by those most affected is a meaningful way of
justifying their authority.
International courts' power frequently extends beyond merely deciding a one-time
dispute. They are part of the architecture of global governance. An international court
or tribunal is not a legislature at the international level. Yet international courts are
engaged in law making. And the activities of some international courts, at least some of
the time, have been characterized as regulatory or administrative in nature. Nico Krisch
and Benedict Kingsbury define global administrative bodies as those engaged in
administrative and regulatory functions, or "the setting and application of rules by
bodies that are not legislative or primarily adjudicative in character."155 They propose
that WTO dispute resolution can, in many cases, be regarded as "another layer of
judicial review of domestic administrative action" and as part of a widely variegated
"global administrative space."156 1.H.H. Weiler, too, notes the emergence of a
"regulatory layer" in the international legal system and situates activities of the WTO
within it. 157 Similarly, Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin argue that investment
treaty arbitration constitutes "a powerful species of global administrative law" because
its norms and mechanisms "exert a strong disciplinary influence over domestic
administrative programrnes."158
Global administrative law applies administrative law principles to bodies engaged
in administration, including international courts. It arises from the idea that global
governance is a form of administration and that administration can be influenced by
administrative law principles. 159 These include principles derived from democratic
theory, like procedural participation, transparency, and reasoned decisions. 160 To the
extent that these bodies are a part of a global-administrative or policy-making space
rather than a traditional dispute-settlement mechanism, it is fitting to apply global

155. Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative
Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT'l L. 1,3 (2006).
156. Id.; see also G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An AnalYSis of
the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE LJ. 829,914 (1995) (asserting that the WTO acts as a regulatory
agency that fonnulates and adjusts trade policy among large democratic states).
157. Weiler, supra note 135, at 549-50.
158. Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global
Administrative Law, 17 EURO. J. INT'l L. 121, 122 (2006); see also David Livshiz, Note, Public Participation

in Disputes Under Regional Trade Agreements: How Much Is Too Much-The Case for a Limited Right of
Intervention, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 529, 532-33 (2005) (characterizing the activities of dispute
settlement institutions provided by regional trade agreements as "analogous to that of a traditional
administrative agency"); Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53
HARv.INT'l LJ. 391, 394 (2012) (analogizing the international investment law to an administrative agency).
159. Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note ISS, at 3.

160. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury et aI., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. IS, 37-39 (2005) (highlighting the procedural participation, transparency, and reasoned
administrative decisions reflected in global administrative practice); Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note ISS, at 4
(stating that transparency, participation, and review are emerging as mechanisms in global regulatory decision
making). But see Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Questfor Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J.
INT'l L. 187, 187,213 (2006) (arguing that such principles are based mainly in Western legal approaches and
are leading to an undesirable "juridification" of political processes).
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administrative law principles, which often reflect democratic ones, to them. 161
Furthennore, whether engaged in administration or law making, international
courts are much more difficult to hold accountable than domestic ones. The concern
that domestic legal scholars raise about the countennajoritarian difficulty162 is
exacerbated at the international level. The difference is that international courts already
make decisions that legislatures would at the domestic level. Armin von Bogdandy and
Ingo Venzke call this phenomenon the "decoupling of law from parliamentary
politics."163 And often there is no legislature at all to counteract the activities of
international courts, as they are rarely embedded in a constitutional framework of
checks and balances. l64 While states may, in some cases, withdraw from an
international court's jurisdiction or refuse to implement its decisions if they are not
directly enforceable, other international actors may have no way of influencing the
decision-making process unless a litigant in a case adopts their views. The case for
democratic controls, including enhanced participation, is much stronger at the
international level than at the domestic one.

c.

Who gets to participate and can enhanced participation be antidemocratic?

One of the challenges of applying democratic theory to the international legal
system is detennining who the demos is. 16S Is it states, peoples, individuals, women,
indigenous persons, or corporations? To whom are international courts supposed to be
accountable? In short, who gets to participate? The democratic principle at issue here is
that those whose interests are affected by the decisions of international courts should
have some ability to participate in their processes. 166 In other words, the demos is the
diverse set of beneficiaries of international court decision making. The demos can also
be called stakeholders. Stakeholders must have some meaningful interest in the
direction that the law may take in a particular dispute. The law at issue must be relevant
to the conduct of public affairs; it must transcend the boundaries of the dispute before
the court and have some broader impact beyond the litigating parties. In this vein, some
courts and tribunals have already limited the use of amicus briefs to disputes

161. See Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 155, at 4 (stating that "building mechanisms analogous to
domestic administrative law systems" has become a trend in the area of global governance).
162. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core o/the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1348-50
(2006) (analyzing the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" countries face when allowing courts to invalidate
legislation).
163. von Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 14, at 993.
164. See id. at 993-95 (finding that the "main avenue of democratic legitimation"-the separation of
powers--is strained in the international context).
165. See Besson, supra note 137, at 68 (stating that no set criteria exists for establishing whether a
multitude of people is a demos or a political community); Nico Krisch, The Pluralism o/Global Administrative
Law, 17 EUR. J. iNT'L 1. 247, 247 (2006) (noting the problem of determining to whom global governance
should be accountable); Weiler, supra note 135, at 560 (discussing the difficulty of determining who the
demos is in a democracy).
166. See Besson, supra note 13 7, at 66 (proposing that democracy mandates that those whose interests
are affected by policies are able to participate in the process that makes those policies); De BUrca, supra note
135, at 276-77 (asserting that participation by all interested individuals is an essential element of the
"democratic-striving" approach).
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concerning the "public interest" alone. 167
The counterargument from a democratic theory standpoint is that opening up the
international courthouse doors to expanded participation will not enhance the
democratic legitimacy of the decisions of international COurtS. 168 Those with the means
and motive to make their voices heard, including NGOs and corporations, may not
have spotless democratic credentials. Further, those who speak the most or the loudest
may not represent the majority of the world. 169 Finally, the state, where numerous
interests must compete and compromise with each other, is the right place for these
kinds of discussions, not international courts. 170 States represent the relevant
stakeholders.
International courts can institutionalize safeguards to address these concerns.
They can adopt approaches to limit the type of stakeholder who gets to participate. For
example, courts could mandate that nonlitigants apply for some kind of consultative
status or preauthorization before a particular dispute resolution system. In Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, the WTO Appellate Body
required nondisputing, nonstate actors wishing to file amicus briefs to make a number
of showings, including that their contributions would help to resolve the pending
dispute in accordance with WTO law and would not duplicate arguments of parties or
third parties to the dispute. 171 Similarly, the IeSID Arbitration Rules grant tribunals the
authority to allow nondisputing parties to file written submissions after consultation
with the parties to the dispute, so long as the submission addresses a matter within the
scope of the dispute.172 The rules also consider whether the submission "would assist
the Tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by
bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the
disputing parties," and whether the nondisputing party has "a significant interest in the
proceeding." 173

167. Eric De Brabandere, NGOs and the "Public Interest": The Legality and Rationale of Amicus
Curiae Interventions in International Economic and Investment Disputes, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 85, 102-03
(2011).
168. See, e.g., Trachtman & Moremen, supra note 2, at 227-28 (questioning the democratic credentials
of nonstate actors such as NOOs and corporations).
169. For example, Egypt argued that allowing amicus briefs at the WTO would give NOOs in developed
countries more of a voice than those from the developing world because the former have greater access to
resources and time. Appellate Body Meeting Minutes, Communication from the Appellate Body to the
Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body on Europoean Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containi~g Products, ~ 21, WT/OCIMl60, (Jan. 23, 2001).
170. See Trachtman & Moremen, supra note 2, at 227-28 (arguing that permitting private participants to
engage in WTO dispute settlement does not enhance the legitimacy of the process because the
''unidimensional'' perspectives and interests of private participants are not on par with the multifaceted
interests of the states that currently participate in WTO dispute settlement).
171. Appellate Body Communication, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, ~ 3(1), WTfDS 13519 (Nov. 8, 2000).
172. ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, Rule 37(2), available at
https:llicsid.woridbank.orgllCSID/StaticFileslbasicdoc/partF-chap04.htm#r37.
173. [d. The tribunal also has the responsibility of ensuring, through consultation with the disputing
parties, that the submission of the nondisputing party "does not disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or
unfairly prejudice either party." [d.
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Alternatively, if these safeguards are deemed insufficient by a particular dispute
resolution body, states could establish standards by which to judge the democratic
credentials of these groups. Another approach is for states and stakeholders to create a
list of broad categories that nonlitigants are allowed to address, like impact on the
environment, human rights, or economic growth, and force various groups to
collaborate on a single brief to address each broad issue. Finally, courts could
themselves ask nonlitigants whose views they believe are relevant and unrepresented to
make a submission.
Arguing that the place for democratic dialogue is at the domestic level is easy
when one comes from a democratic state. Yet many potential participants do not. Even
when they do, the state may have ignored the views of a particular group in its internal
decision-making process. A group may be traditionally discriminated against by the
state, as indigenous people frequently are, or it may be transnational and possess little
gravitas within the borders of anyone state. One could attempt to force democratic
contestation to take place at the domestic level by requiring states to submit their
litigation strategy ideas to the public for comment, as at least one free trade agreement
did. 174 Nonetheless, if a state systematically discriminates, or if a transnational group is
involved, true democratic contestation is unlikely to take place. In other words, the
international court may be the only place where a multitude of interested voices is
heard.

d.

What does participation in the conduct o/public affairs look like?

The right to participate in the conduct of public affairs requires some commitment
to transparency. Pleadings and hearings must be open and accessible for nonlitigants to
determine whether they have interests at issue and whether they have something unique
and worthwhile to contribute to the discussion. Some courts' official languages are not
in the language-or even the common language-of the litigating parties, making it
very difficult for stakeholders to comment on what the court is doing, or even on their
own state's behavior in the proceedings. Similarly, simultaneous transcription or
televised hearings should be the norm for international courts located across the world
from where their rulings will be felt.
What should the involvement of the public look like? Different courts may adopt
different methods. One option is to allow stakeholders to file amicus briefs. Even if
their rights are not directly at issue, stakeholders should have the opportunity to present
relevant points as the court makes decisions that will shape the law prospectively.
Again, especially when states are unrepresentative, amicus participation is perhaps the
only formal way that nonstate actors and nonIitigants can influence policy making
taking place in international courts. If an overwhelming number of groups or
individuals seek to file amicus briefs, courts can develop methods by which to screen
and filter the number of briefs, including establishing in which areas they wish to hear
contributions and ensuring that submissions are not duplicative.
Several tribunals have already moved in the direction of allowing amicus
participation for nonstate actors. For example, human rights courts such as the ECHR
174. United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-78, 117 Stat.
948 (2003).
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and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights typically accept amicus briefs. 175
Nonetheless, although the WTO and international investment tribunals increasingly
permit the use of amicus briefs as a policy matter,176 Eric De Brabandere points out that
"there has not yet been substantial effective acceptance or consideration of such
submissions in particular cases."177 Other international courts, including the ICJ, do not
allow for amicus participation at all in contentious cases. 178
Another approach is to create a new position in the secretariats of these various
international courts to advise them on the impact of their decision making on
nondisputing parties. This person could present the court or tribunal with information
about the potential impact of its decisions on nonlitigants whose interests are
implicated in the case. Stakeholders could share their concerns and arguments with this
person who would present them to the tribunal. Such an advisor would have to possess
excellent credentials and credibility and the ability to absorb and condense information
gleaned from a number of sources.
Regardless of whether an institutional advisor or amicus briefs are used,
adjudicators must be open to the arguments of nonlitigants for their participation to be
meaningful. They must not prize the interests of the litigating parties over those of
other nonlitigating parties, so long as the nonlitigating parties make arguments relevant
to determination of the underlying dispute. This may require input from nonstate actors
in the appointment of judges and arbitrators. Finally, adjudicators must consider the
views of nonlitigants in their decision making to the extent that they matter for
resolution of the underlying dispute.
As nonstate actors are increasingly recognized as holders of rights and duties
under international law, their exclusion from processes that adjudicate their

175. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 24, art.
36(2) (providing that "[t]he President of the Court may, in the interest of the proper administration of justice,
invite any High Contracting Party which is not a party to the proceedings or any person concerned who is not
the applicant to submit written comments or take part in hearings"); Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, art. 44, approved by the court during its 85th regular period of sessions, held from
Nov. 16-28,2009, available at http://www.corteidh.or.crlsitiosireglamento/nov_2009_ing.pdf.
176. Although the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding does not provide for amicus participation,
the Appellate Body ruled in the United States-Shrimp and United States-Lead and Bismuth II cases that WTO
panels and the Appellate Body have the power to accept amicus briefs. See Appellate Body Report, United
States - Import Prohibition a/Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products" 91, WTIDS58/ABIRW (Oct. 22 2001)
(admitting amicus briefs attached to the United States' submission); Appellate Body Report, United States Imposition 0/ Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products
Originating in the United Kingdom" 39, WTIDSI38/ABIR (May 10,2000) (fmding that the WTO Appellate
Body has "the legal authority to decide whether or not to accept and consider any information that we believe
is pertinent"). Similarly, the ICSID Arbitration Rules now too allow for submissions by nondisputing parties,
upon consultation with the litigating parties. ISCID Convention Regulations & Rules, Arbitration Rule 37(2),
Apr. 2006, available at http://icsid.woridbank.org/lCSID/StaticFileslbasicdoc/CRR_ English-final.pdf; see also
Methanex Corp v. United States, Decision of Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as Amici
Curaie",47, 53 (Jan. 1,2001 NAFTAIUNCITRAL) (stating that NAFTA tribunals have the power to accept
amicus curiae submissions).
177. De Brabandere, supra note 167, at 87.
178. See ICJ Statute, supra note 22 (containing no provisions on amicus submissions by nonstate actors);
SHABTAI ROSENNE, 2 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920-1996, at 653-54 (3d ed.
1997) (stating that IC] practice "does not envisage" the presentation ofargurnents by nonstate actors).
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entitlements and shape their interests threatens to undermine the authority of
international courts and tribunals. It becomes difficult to justify international courts'
authority when extended over persons who lack the ability to participate or sometimes
even to access judicial proceedings that adjudicate their international legal rights and
obligations or shape public policy. Legitimacy requires a reimagining of procedural
fairness to account for both rights holders and stakeholders.

B.

What About Justice (or Substantive Legitimacy)?

Many have shied away from justice as important to legitimacy in the international
arena. Fewer still have explicitly applied such a lens to international courts. This Part
argues that substantive justice can and should be an important part of legitimacy for
international courts.
Most scholars have steered away from justice in the legitimacy debate for a
number of reasons. Allen Buchanan and David Golove propose that legal realists, who
view international relations as a Hobbesian state of nature, and legal nihilists, who
contend that international law is not law, have traditionally dominated the field of
international legal philosophy and see no place for moral theorizing. 179 Thomas Franck
hesitated to probe the linkages between justice and legitimacy for both "operational"
and "theoretical" reasons. 180 Operationally, justice can only be done to people, not
entities like states, and international law primarily addresses states, not individuals,
making it quite complicated to discern workable principles of justice. 181 For example,
John Rawls's suggestion of putting foreign ministers behind a "veil of ignorance" to
discern principles of justice would result in rules that favor states' interests over those
of individuals. 182 Foreign ministers would likely arrive at a rule of nonintervention,
which would allow for genocide, and therefore cannot be juSt. 183 Second, from a
theoretical perspective, distinguishing between justice and legitimacy allows for the
development of principles that acknowledge and accommodate the existence of
different moral communities, while postponing debate on the meaning of justice. 184
Despite his discomfort with engaging in the justice debate, Franck simultaneously
embraced the centrality of justice: "[a]s the firm outlines of world order become readily
apparent, and as that order increasingly focuses on the individual's place in global
society, a keener understanding of the theory, function, and power of justice must
surely move to the top of the agenda."18S
Franck's operationalization critique is less powerful than it used to be. First,
international law is increasingly recognized to address the rights and duties of actors

179. Allen Buchanan & David Golove, Philosophy ofInternational Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 871, 872-73 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); see also

Caron, supra note 5, at 514 (stating that "[i]n general, critiques of legitimacy-at least in legal scholarshipoften are directed to procedural rather than substantive legitimacy").
180. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 208--09 (1990).

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
/d.

at 218--21 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 7 (1971).
at 221.
at 236.
at 246.
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beyond states, especially natural persons. While it may be primarily aimed at states,
international law contains much about the rights and duties of human beings, without
whom states would not exist in the first place. It may be challenging to discern
workable principles of justice for a multifarious world of international actors, but the
pursuit of justice remains an important objective of international law. 186 Second, by
excluding all international actors except states, one limits the capacity to think
creatively and deeply about both justice and legitimacy.
As for the theoretical critique, Franck's "firm outlines of world order" are more
apparent. 187 While discerning a common standard of justice in a world of seven billion
people, states, corporations, and international organizations is a daunting challenge, a
growing consensus exists that justice requires, at a minimum, some recognition of the
freedom and equality of human beings. 188 As explained below, the international
community, through treaties and other sources of international law, has deemed
violations of some human rights so egregious that it forbids their commission under
any circumstances. It has reached some agreement on justice, or rather injustice. So
long as international courts help states to better respect these substantive legal
obligations than they would on their own, Joseph Raz's service conception of authority
links justice and legitimacy.189 Further, courts cannot condone or facilitate the violation
of a minimum core set of human rights and remain legitimate.
1.

A Minimum Core Set of Human Rights

The international community agrees that some core set of human rights exists that
should not be violated in any circumstance. Both global and regional treaties prohibit
derogation from a limited subset of rights even during public emergency or war. For
example, the ICCPR, regardless of the existence of a public emergency, forbids states
from derogating from (1) rights to life, freedom from torture, and freedom from
slavery; (2) freedom from imprisonment for failure to fulfill a contractual obligation;
(3) freedom from the application of ex post facto laws in criminal trials; (4) recognition
as a person before the law; and (5) freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 190 The
Convention Against Torture, too, declares that "[n]o exceptional circumstances
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any

186. See Mortimer Sellers, Parochialism, Cosmopolitanism, and Justice, in PAROCHIALISM,
COSMOPOLITANISM, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 13, at 250, 259 (stating that
the "purpose oflaw and the international community is justice," as recognized by the United Nations Charter);
Martti Koskenniemi, Book Review, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 175, 178 (1992) (discussing the "essential continuity
and embeddedness" of law and justice); W. Michael Reisman, Theory About Law: Jurisprudence for a Free
Society, 108 YALE L.J. 935, 939 (1999) (describing Myres McDougal and the New Haven School's
jurisprudential "insistence that the end of law and the criterion for appraisal of particular decisions was their
degree of contribution to the achievement of a public order of human dignity").
187. FRANCK, supra note 180, at 246.
188. See TES6N, supra note 104, at I (arguing that "the end of international law must ... be to benefit,
serve, and protect human being"); Buchanan & Golove, supra note 179, at 876--77 (explaining that the
expanding global culture of human rights reflects a conception of justice based on "the recognition of the
equality and freedom of all persons").
189. See infra Part 1l1.B.2 for an analysis ofRaz's service conception of authority.
190. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 57, arts. 4, 6, 7, II, 15, 18.

98

TEMPLE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 86

other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture."191 Similarly, the
Genocide Convention declares that states must commit themselves to prevent and
punish genocide, "whether committed in time of peace or in time ofwar."192
The American Convention on Human Rights provides that states may not suspend
the rights to juridical personality, life, humane treatment (freedom from torture),
freedom from slavery, freedom from ex post facto laws, freedom of conscience and
religion, rights of the family, right to a name, rights of the child, right to nationality,
right to participate in government, or of judicial guarantees essential for the protection
of such rightS. 193 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms establishes that no derogation is permitted during a time of
emergency from the rights to life (unless from lawful acts of war), freedom from
torture, freedom from slavery, and freedom from ex post facto laws}94 The African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights does not contain a nonderogation clause. 195 But
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has already declared Articles 7
(fair trial rights, no application of ex post facto laws), 2 (non-discrimination), and 3
(equal protection) as nonderogable even in times of emergency; 96 and it may recognize
more in the future. 197
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides compelling
evidence of consensus that a minimum core of human rights guarantees exists that
should not be violated. Specifically, by describing "the most serious crimes of concern
to the international community as a whole," including genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity, the Rome Statute establishes that some violations of human
rights are so egregious that the international community will condemn and prosecute
them at the international level. 198 Further, the Rome Statute limits the court to
application and interpretation of applicable law that is "consistent with internationally
recognized human rightS."199 That is, in the Rome Statute, the international community
recognizes that some human rights have the power to trump all other applicable sources
of law in the International Criminal Court.

191. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
supra note 57, art. 2(2).
192. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. I, Dec. 9, 1948,78
V.N.T.S.277.
193. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 97, art. 27(2).
194. ECHR, supra note 24, arts. 2, 3, 4, 7,15.
195. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 120; see also V.O. Vmozurike,
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 902, 909-10 (1983) (discussing the
lack of a nonderogation clause in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights).
196. Purohit & Moore v. Gambia, Afr. Comm'n on Human & Peoples' Rights., Commc'n No. 241/2001,
'lJ 49 (2003), available at http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/africalcomcasesI241-200I.html(discussing Articles
2 and 3); Civil Liberties Organisation, Legal Defence Centre, Legal Defence & Assistance Project v. Nigeria,
Afr. Comm'n Human & Peoples' Rights, Commc'n No. 218/98, 'lJ 27 (1998), available at
http://wwwl.urnn.edulhumanrts/africalcomcasesI218-98.html(discussing Article 7).
197. Adeno Addis, Book Review, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 879, 881-1l2 (2004) (arguing that Article 60 of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights provides the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights with the authority to invoke the ICCPR and declare provisions nonderogable).
198. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998,2187 V.N.T.S. 90.
199. Id. art. 21.
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Further, the international community has recognized the existence of jus cogens,
or peremptory norms that supersede all other sources of legal obligation, as well as
erga omnes obligations, or duties that states owe to all other states. 200 The debate
continues on what qualifies as a peremptory norm, but the usual suspects include the
prohibitions against genocide, slavery, torture, and racial discrimination. 201 These
appear to coincide with the nonderogation provisions of the ICCPR, the European
Convention, the American Convention, and potentially the African Charter, the
Genocide and Torture Conventions, and conduct deemed criminal by the Rome
Statute. 202
Publicists, too, have sought to enumerate which rights fall within this category.203
For example, Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane suggest that the agreed-upon
core includes rights to physical security, freedom from slavery, servitude and forced
occupations, and the right to subsistence. 204 Similarly, David Miller argues that the
international community has a responsibility to protect "basic rights" like "rights to
life, bodily integrity, basic nutrition and health, and so forth."205
Listing core rights is somewhat controversial and requires greater consensus. 206
For example, feminist scholars assert that political rights are generally overemphasized
and obviate economic, social, and cultural rights that affect women's lives more
deeply.207 Third world critiques, too, question the traditional western rights literature as
leaving out the fundamental concerns of much of the world. 2og Further, one can
imagine linking justice to an act's impact on the environment or on the equitable
distribution of resources among different peoples. 209 Finally, the set of core rights may
change over time and may be of greater scope in some regions of the world than

200. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 53, 64, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 V.N.T.S. 331 (stating that all treaties that conflict with peremptory norms are void); Barcelona Traction,
Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, ~ 33 (Feb. 5) (declaring that states have
obligations to the international community as a whole).
201. Erika de Wet, The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation of
the Emerging International Constitutional Order, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 611, 616 (2006).
202. See supra notes 200-208 for a discussion of the provisions contained within these various charters,
conventions, and statutes. Customary international law can also provide a source for these prohibitions but is
not discussed in this Article.
203. Although their teachings do not constitute a formal source of international law, they can be used as
a "subsidiary means" for the determination of rules of international law. ICJ Statute, supra note 22, art. 38.
204. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 7, at 420.
205. David Miller, The Responsibility to Protect Human Rights, in LEGITIMACY, JUSTICE AND PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW,supra note 13, at 232, 232.
206. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 7, at 420 (acknowledging that disagreement exists as to the
content of core rights).
207. Hilary Charlesworth et aI., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. [NT'L L. 613, 63436 (1991).

208. E.g., Makau Mutua, Human Rights and Powerlessness: Pathologies of Choice and Substance, 56
BUFF.

L. REv. 1027,1027-28 (2008).

209. See Daniel Butt, 'Victors' Justice? Historic Injustice and the Legitimacy of International Law, in
LEGITIMACY, JUSTICE AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 13, at 163, 164 (arguing that existing
international law reinforces and preserves unjust resource distribution among states); Alan Boyle, Human
Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 471, 472 (2007) (discussing
the relationship between environmental and human rights).
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others. 210 Yet although serious debate exists on the limits of core rights, it is difficult to
deny that some minimum agreed-upon set exists.2l1 At a bare minimum, this list
appears to include the prohibitions against genocide, torture, racial discrimination, and
slavery.
2.

Linking the Core Rights to Legitimacy and Counterarguments

What is the link between violation of a core set of human rights by states and the
legitimacy of international courts? This Part provides two answers and seeks to respond
to some counterarguments. The first answer relies on Raz's service conception of
authority. The second argues that international courts that facilitate or tacitly assent to
conduct that the international community as a whole condemns are illegitimate.
Raz's service conception of authority, the preeminent instrumentalist approach,
posits that an authority is justified when (1) it takes into account reasons that
independently apply to the subjects of its directives and are relevant in the
circumstances ("dependence thesis"), and (2) the subjects are more likely to comply
with reasons that apply to them independently by accepting and implementing the
authority's directives than by attempting to follow these reasons on their own ("normal
justification thesis").2I2 In other words, an authority is justified when its subjects do a
better job of complying with their obligations by doing what the authority says than
they would in the authority's absence.213
International law prohibits states from violating some core set of human rights
guarantees, no matter what the circumstances. They cannot commit genocide, enslave,
torture, or engage in racial discrimination. Consequently, an international court's
authority is justified when it helps states comply with these prohibitions and when it
takes these prohibitions into account when issuing its decisions. International courts
can help states to better comply with these requirements because they bring disputes
from the war room to the courtroom, force state decision makers to view their actions
through the lens of international law rather than politics, and likely raise the costs of
noncompliance through judicial judgments and orders. International courts would lack
legitimacy if states did no better at complying with these human rights guarantees in
their absence.
Another argument for the link between injustice and illegitimacy is that
international courts lack the authority to condone or facilitate state conduct that violates
these prohibitions. International courts are established by states to apply international
law. They cannot act in a manner that facilitates the violation of international law,
especially norms the international community deems of such high stature. To do so
210. de Wet, supra note 201, at 612-13.
211. See John Tasioulas, The Legitimacy of International Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL
supra note 99, at 97,107 (asserting that scholars' rejection of ethical objectivity is "deeply problematic"
because it "forecloses on the possibility of radical, non-question-begging criticism of social practices, no
matter how seemingly wicked").
LAW,

212. RAz, supra note 13, at 47, 53. In recent years, a number of international law scholars have
examined Joseph Raz's scholarship in the context of the legitimacy of international law. E.g., Meyer &
Sanklecha, supra note 13, at 5-8; Tasioulas, supra note 211, at 100--11.
213. The "pre-emption thesis" adds that a legitimate authority'S orders provide a reason for action that
supersedes some independent reasons. RAz, supra note 13, at 46-47; Meyer & Sanklecha, supra note 13, at 6.
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would exceed the scope of authority delegated to them.
But doesn't considering whether a state's behavior violates core human rights run
contrary to the object and purpose of many of these courts (at least the non-humanrights ones)? Why should the WTO's Appellate Body and ICSID think about human
rights when they were established to liberalize trade and promote foreign investment?
An international court would act beyond the scope of its delegated authority by
considering issues not raised by the litigating parties. Requiring international courts of
all kinds to consider the fundamental human rights implications of their decisions is a
distraction from the primary mission of international courts as dispute settlers.
Considering whether state action would violate a core set of human rights
guarantees does not run contrary to the object and purpose of international adjudication
but rather is consistent with it. The various regimes that an international court may
address can be considered "mutually supportive."214 The idea is that all international
rules are part of the same legal system and should be understood as "reinforcing each
other with a view to fostering harmonization and complementarity, as opposed to
conflictual relationships."215 None of these courts exist in "clinical isolation" from the
rest of public international law, including human rights law. 216 The duty not to violate
basic human rights is part of the world of law from which they draw, even if the case at
issue concerns trade law, the law of the sea, or expropriation. 217 Simply, there are some
lines that international courts cannot cross and still retain their legitimacy.218
Further, mandating that states comply with a core set of human rights norms is not
like the application of an ex post facto law. States themselves agreed to be bound by a
core set of human rights requirements through wide ratification of human rights treaties
and by virtue of customary international law and jus cogens norms. They have been on
notice for many years that these are part of their international legal obligations.
Not only do morality and law require states to act consistent with these human
rights guarantees, but also mandating that courts consider whether state action will
violate these rights will strengthen the normative power and appeal of all of their
decisions. By ignoring states' legal obligations with respect to core human rights,

214. Riccardo Pavoni, Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making: A
Watershedfor the 'WTO-and-Competing-Regimes' Debate?, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 649, 650 (2010).
215. /d. at 650.
216. Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
17, WTIDS2/ABIR (Apr. 29, 1996); see also Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 133, ~ 45
(referring to the WTO's decision not to read the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in isolation from the
rest of international law).
217. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95
AM. J. INT'LL. 535,539 (2001) (discussing the interrelation of trade law and the international legal system).
218. See KLABBERS ET AL., supra note 15, at 152 (arguing that the decisions of international courts that
violate international human rights should not be respected by national courts). Fernando Tes6n proposes that:
All exercise of power must be morally legitimate. Roughly, an exercise of power is morally
legitimate when it is the result of political consent and respects the basic rights of the individuals
subject to that power. If international law is to be morally legitimate, therefore, it must mandate that
states respect human rights as a precondition for joining the international community.
TES6N, supra note 104, at 2. This argument is similar to Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane's argument
that global governance institutions must meet some minimum level of moral acceptability for legitimacy.
Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 7, at 419-422.
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courts risk undermining their own power in other cases. Imagine if a court denied a
provisional measures request because it found that state sovereignty trumped an
ongoing genocide. The taint of the court's decision is likely to spill over into other
cases and to undermine the court's objectives. 219 Is there any way to justify the
authority of such a court?
3.

Institutional Reforms

Then what institutional reforms can be made to promote justice? First, states and
others should engage in an ongoing discussion to determine which additional violations
of basic human rights they will not permit international courts to condone.220 These
rights may vary by region or by the subject matter jurisdiction of a particular court. For
example, parties and stakeholders at ICSID may arrive at a different list than the ICI.
The emergence of different standards in different courts is not necessarily a cause for
concern so long as the bare minimum is respected. Second, courts must consider the
implications of their decisions on the core set of fundamental human rights in each
decision they make. Third, they must determine whether a conflict exists between the
core set of individual rights and the other competing rights and obligations at issue in
the case. Fourth, if a conflict exists, the court must hold these core individual rights
above any other rights and obligations involved in the case. Courts must help states
better to comply with core human rights requirements than states would in their
absence, and international courts cannot cross certain substantive lines and still
maintain their legitimacy, regardless of competing rights. This approach to legitimacy
ultimately establishes a normative hierarchy that prioritizes a subset of individual
human rights (or the duties of states not to violate them) above other rights and duties.
Consequently, no complex doctrine to reconcile interregime conflicts is necessary, at
least with respect to this core set of human rights and any other regime.221 Nonetheless,
the determination of the existence of a conflict may require the development of new

219. In the same vein, Article 14 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International
Organizations establishes that:
An international organization which aids or assists a State or another international organization
in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the State or the latter organization is
internationally responsible for doing so if:
(a) the former organization does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally
wrongful act; and
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that organization.
Responsibility of International Organizations, supra, note 96, art. 14. Article 6 provides that the conduct of any
organ or agency of the organization is attributable to the organization. Id.
220. See Buchanan, supra note 99, at 96 (suggesting that the international order cannot rely on universal
rights as part of its conception of its own legitimacy without providing a "credible public justification for the
claim that it has properly identified and specified a set of genuinely universal rights").
221. Jeffrey Dunoff aptly characterizes these as regime conflicts. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, International Law in
Perplexing Times, 25 MD. J. INT'L L. II, 21 (2010); see also Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in
International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 291,293 (2006) (discussing the need to further develop choice of law
principles to address conflicts between norms of equivalent status). Some have looked to Article 31(3)(c) of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, distinctions between lex specialis and lex posterior, and the
concept of jus cogens in response to the challenge of interregime conflicts. Fragmentation of International
Law. supra note 133, ~ 3; PROST,supra note 97, at 11-12.
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interpretive tools.222
C.

Achieving Normative Goals

A second substantive condition of legitimacy for international courts is that they
must promote the purposes of the normative regimes they are charged with interpreting
and applying. As discussed above, international courts no longer exist as mere dispute
settlers but are increasingly recognized to espouse particular normative regimes.
Simply, as mandated by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,223 a court's
rulings must be consistent with the object and purpose of the normative regime or
regimes it was created to adjudicate. For example, if a human rights court ceases to
protect human rights or fails to uphold states' responsibilities not to violate human
rights, it no longer possesses justified authority. A court will not lose all legitimacy if it
makes a mistake in judgment or if it fails to promote its mission in one or two cases.
Rather, its rulings must accord with the institution's underlying objectives with
sufficient frequency to justify its authority.224
This requires identification of the constellation of normative regimes that a court
should consider (e.g., trade law, environmental law, human rights law, investment law),
the object and purposes of each of these, and a prioritization of the regimes most
important within a particular dispute resolution system. Guidance may be found in
constitutive instruments, relevant treaties, custom and general principles, the court's
previous interpretations, and critiques by scholars and others. After discerning what
law applies and what its purposes are, it is essential to understand the overriding goals
or mission of the court or how it should reconcile conflicting regimes. What hierarchy
of norms exists in a particular court? In a recent article on effectiveness and
international courts, Yuval Shany proposed that determining the goals of international
courts requires identification of mandate providers and analysis of the range and variety
of their goals.225 Although Shany focused almost exclusively on states and international
organizations as mandate providers, one can imagine inclusive, public, transparent, and
periodic dialogue involving other stakeholders concerning evolving goals for various
international courts.
Legitimacy requires that normative goals be achieved within the framework of
justice. 226 In other words, a court that facilitates the violation of a core set of human
rights protections is illegitimate, regardless of whether it achieves other normative
goals in the process.

222. See Pavoni, supra note 214, at 650-51 (discussing a shift in the interpretation of multilateral
environmental agreements to reduce conflicts with WTO rules).
223. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 200, arts. 31-32.
224. See RAZ, supra note 13, at 47 (explaining that the normal way to justify an institution's authority is
not to assume that it will always succeed in behaving ideally, but rather that it will do so often enough to
justify its own authority).
225. Shany, supra note 83, at 240-48.
226. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of legitimacy and justice.
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CONCLUSION

Traditional approaches to the legitimacy of international courts are based on
outmoded assumptions about the impact and role of international courts. This Article
proposes a new theory of legitimacy for international courts with both procedural and
substantive aspects. First, legal persons whose international legal rights and duties are
at issue in international court proceedings must have the right to present their views.
Second, to the extent international courts are making law or policy, those potentially
affected should have the ability to participate. Third, international courts are legitimate
when they help states to better comply with a core set of human rights obligations than
states would without international courts. Fourth, international courts cannot facilitate
the violation of core norms by states and still retain their legitimacy. Finally, legitimacy
requires that courts act in a manner generally consistent with the object and purpose of
the normative regimes they interpret and apply.
The articulation of this theory shows that much more work remains to be done.
How should we distinguish between international courts' diverse functions? How do
we identify the primary normative goals of an international court? Is a diversity of
normative hierarchies in different courts a threat to the coherence of international
law?227 This Article takes the position that some basic individual human rights must
take precedence over other international legal commitments to other actors. 228 What
guidance needs to be provided to courts deciding between norms of equivalent value to
different international legal persons? To what extent does the type of actor to whom the
obligation is owed matter? What are the implications for international dispute
resolution should the scope of core rights grow over time? How would making the
relatively modest institutional changes that this paper suggests affect the effectiveness
of international courts?
More work is needed in the field of comparative international courts as well.
Which courts are the most and least legitimate? Which ones are farthest behind in
crafting institutional reforms to attain procedural fairness and justice and better to
achieve normative goals? Which ones are doing the best job? What can courts and
court reformers learn from each other's mistakes and successes? If we apply the
legitimacy standards presented here, where do the various international courts
operating today fall? For example, the IC] may find itself dangerously far from the top
of the list. In the IC], no one aside from states has standing in contentious cases or the
right to file an amicus brief. Parties to the IC] Statute do not meet with any frequency
to consider amendments.
The court's record with respect to interregime conflicts involving human rights
requires more assessment, although in at least two recent cases, it arguably construed
immunity doctrines to avoid addressing difficult human rights concerns.229 Whether the

227. See PROST, supra note 97, at 4--7 (discussing the roots of fragmentation and the "anxiety" it
engenders).
228. This Article does not transfonn all international courts into human rights courts. Rather, all
international courts are bound to apply a minimum core set of human rights guarantees agreed to by states, and
they cannot facilitate the violation of these core nonns. See supra Parts 1II.B.1-2 for a discussion of the
relationship between core human rights and legitimacy.
229. See e.g., Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening), Judgment, 2012
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court is achieving the nonnative goals within its purview-and what these goals areis another matter for debate and discussion.
International courts have a significant and growing impact on the rights, duties,
and interests of numerous international actors. Their importance and the increasing
scope of their authority call for deeper and more creative inquiry about the
underpinnings of their legitimacy. This Article employs legal philosophy and
jurisprudential approaches to propose that procedural fairness to rights holders and
stakeholders and the promotion of relevant nonnative regimes consistent with
fundamental human rights are essential for the legitimacy of international courts. It
seeks to motivate stakeholders of all kinds to engage in a serious debate about what
justifies the authority of international courts and what limits that authority should have.

I.C.J. I, ~ 91 (Feb. 3) (deciding that states enjoy jurisdictional immunity for acta jure imperii causing injury in
other states during armed conflict regardless of the gravity of crimes committed or absence of an alternative
remedy); Arrest Warrant of II April 2000 (Oem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, ~ 54 (Feb. 14)
(granting an incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs immunity from criminal jurisdiction outside his home state
during his tenure).
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